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PLAUSIBLY PLEADING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

CHARLES A. SULLIVAN*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s unanimous 2002 decision in Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., which took a very permissive approach to pleading
discrimination claims, may or may not remain good law after
Ashcroft v. Iqbal. As is well known, Iqbal took a restrictive approach
to pleading generally under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and its application to employment discrimination cases could pose
serious problems for plaintiffs attempting to get into federal court. In
addition, there is certainly a tension between Swierkiewicz and
Iqbal. This is in part because the former is a strong reaffirmation of
notice pleading as it has traditionally been understood whereas the
latter makes clear that “plausible pleading” is something very
different. But it is also because Iqbal was, after all, a discrimination
case, albeit brought under the Constitution rather than a federal
statute, and its finding that the discrimination alleged there was not
plausibly pled could easily be applied to statutes such as Title VII,
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act.
Numerous scholars have analyzed Iqbal generally and several
have addressed the application of plausible pleading to claims under
the antidiscrimination laws. A respectable view is that Swierkiewicz
remains good law, although the commentators recognize legitimate
questions about its continued vitality. This Article, while agreeing
that readings of both Swierkiewicz and Iqbal would permit this
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School. B.A., Siena College, 1965; LL.B., Harvard
Law School, 1968. I thank my coauthors on CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION, Michael J. Zimmer and Rebecca Hanner White, for their graciousness in
permitting me to draw on their work. Mike Zimmer also provided very helpful comments on
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result, nevertheless explores the contrary possibility: supposing Iqbal
sub silentio overruled Swierkiewicz and applies plausible pleading
to discrimination claims, what must a plaintiff plead to avoid
dismissal for failure to state a claim?
The most obvious response is that the plaintiff should plead a
prima facie case of discrimination under the traditional McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green standard. Although Swierkiewicz held that
pleading a prima facie case was not necessary, in part because there
are other ways of proving discrimination, it did not suggest that such
pleading would be insufficient. There are, however, complications
with pleading a traditional prima facie case that should be explored.
Further, there are at least three alternatives for attorneys who cannot, consistent with Rule 11, allege such a prima facie case. First, the
Article proposes that the plaintiff might survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion by pleading “direct evidence” of discrimination. Although the
term has a checkered history in discrimination jurisprudence, the
pleading context suggests a new look at an old concept. Second, the
Article addresses the possibility of pleading the existence of a
“comparator” whose more favorable treatment than the plaintiff may
make the claim of discrimination plausible.
Third, and perhaps most radically, the Article argues that
plaintiffs should be able to take the Supreme Court at its word in
Iqbal that, in deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, a district court must take as true all facts, as opposed to legal
conclusions, alleged in the complaint. The Article proposes that
plaintiffs plead the existence of social science research showing the
pervasiveness of discrimination. Taken as true, this body of literature
may well “nudge” a particular claim across the border drawn by the
Supreme Court between a “possible” claim and a “plausible” one.
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INTRODUCTION
A decade ago, the Second Circuit summarily affirmed the grant
of a Rule 12(b)(6)1 motion to dismiss an employment discrimination
complaint for failure to state a claim under which relief can be
granted.2 The plaintiff had alleged that he had been first demoted
and ultimately fired by his employer because of his national origin
and age in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).3 He did plead
his age (fifty-three), and national origin (Hungarian), and the
younger age (thirty-two) and different national origin (French) of
the favored coworker.4 He also alleged that he had twenty-five years’
more experience than the coworker.5 Even though Rule 8 requires
only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief ”6 and the plaintiff ’s allegations provided
the defendant with notice of the claims against it, the Second
Circuit held that the failure of the plaintiff to plead even a prima
facie case of discrimination within the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green7 proof scheme rendered the complaint fatally deficient.8
1. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
2. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 5 F. App’x 63, 65 (2d Cir. 2001), rev’d, 534 U.S. 506
(2002).
3. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 509 (2002).
4. Id. at 514.
5. Id. at 508 (“Petitioner claims that Mr. Papadopoulo had only one year of underwriting
experience at the time he was promoted, and therefore was less experienced and less qualified
to be CUO than he, since at that point he had 26 years of experience in the insurance
industry.”).
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
7. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see infra notes 179-97 and accompanying text.
8. The Court wrote,
With respect to national origin, the only circumstances Swierkiewicz pled are
that he is Hungarian, others at Sorema are French, and the conclusory
allegation that his termination was motivated by national origin discrimination.
We agree with the district court that these allegations are insufficient as a
matter of law to raise an inference of discrimination.
... [With respect to age, t]he only circumstance that Swierkiewicz alleges gives
rise to an inference of age discrimination is Chavel’s comment [several years
previously] that Chavel wanted to “energize” the underwriting department. We
agree with the district court that this allegation is insufficient as a matter of law
to raise an inference of discrimination.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 5 F. App’x 63, 64-65 (2d Cir. 2001), rev’d, 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
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In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., an opinion written by Justice
Thomas, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed, reaffirming the
traditional view of notice pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.9 Put simply, the plaintiff ’s complaint gave the defendant
employer adequate notice of both the act being challenged—
plaintiff ’s discharge—and the legal bases upon which he was
suing—national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII and
age discrimination in violation of the ADEA. Since the employer
knew what adverse actions were being charged, who the supposed
favored employee was, and what statutory requirements were
allegedly violated, the Court held that the complaint had all the
information that notice pleading required.10 As for the failure to
plead a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, the Court noted
that McDonnell Douglas provides “an evidentiary standard, not a
pleading requirement”;11 therefore, “under a notice pleading system,
it is not appropriate to require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing
a prima facie case.”12 Whatever hurdles employment discrimination
plaintiffs had to face in their quest for vindication, pleading problems appeared to be a thing of the past.
After Swierkiewicz, even judges in circuits often viewed as hostile
to these causes of action had little patience with Rule 12(b)(6)
motions for the supposed failure of discrimination plaintiffs to state
a claim. For example, in Bennett v. Schmidt, Judge Easterbrook
wrote, “Because racial discrimination in employment is ‘a claim
upon which relief can be granted,’ this complaint could not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). ‘I was turned down for a job because of
my race’ is all a complaint has to say.”13
9. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515.
10. Id. at 514. The Court also cited approvingly McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 n.11 (1976). Id. at 511. McDonald rejected the
defendant’s argument that plaintiffs “were required to plead with ‘particularity’ the degree
of similarity between their culpability in the alleged theft and the involvement of the favored
coemployee, Jackson. This assertion ... too narrowly constricts the role of the pleadings.”
McDonald, 427 U.S. at 283 n.11.
11. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510.
12. Id. at 511.
13. 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998). He went on to write, “Because success on a
disparate-treatment approach under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... requires proof
of intentional discrimination, a plaintiff might want to allege intent—although this is implied
by a claim of racial ‘discrimination.’” Id.; see also Kolupa v. Roselle Park Dist., 438 F.3d 713,
714 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Religious discrimination in employment is prohibited by federal law.
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In the past few years, however, this certainty has been severely
shaken. In two remarkable cases, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly14
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,15 the Court adopted a “plausible pleading”
standard for Rule 12(b)(6) motions, a standard whose operational
meaning remains unclear but which many believe has radically
changed pleading requirements under the Federal Rules.16
If Swierkiewicz survives the Twombly/Iqbal transformation,
employment discrimination litigation will largely be safe from
plausible pleading; indeed, plausible pleading may itself be far less
radical than some have predicted if the recent cases leave
Swierkiewicz intact.17 And there is certainly reason to believe that
Swierkiewicz is still good law—it is a very recent, unanimous
decision of the Court, and it was cited with apparent approval in
Twombly.18 Further, the Court has cautioned that lower courts
should not view its opinions as overruled even if their logic appears
to have been undercut by subsequent decisions,19 and a number
of lower courts have heeded this caution with respect to
Swierkiewicz.20
Accordingly, all a complaint in federal court need do to state a claim for relief is recite that
the employer has caused some concrete injury by holding the worker’s religion against him....
It is enough to name the plaintiff and the defendant, state the nature of the grievance, and
give a few tidbits (such as the date) that will let the defendant investigate. A full narrative
is unnecessary.”).
14. 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007).
15. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
16. E.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority’s
rule “marks a fundamental—and unjustified—change in the character of pretrial practice”);
see infra note 130 and accompanying text.
17. Another possibility is that the plausible pleading regime will change the pleading
terrain in every area except employment discrimination litigation. See infra text
accompanying note 19.
18. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569-70 (“As the District Court correctly understood, however,
‘Swierkiewicz did not change the law of pleading, but simply re-emphasized ... that the Second
Circuit’s use of a heightened pleading standard for Title VII cases was contrary to the Federal
Rules’ structure of liberal pleading requirements.’”).
19. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (“We do not acknowledge, and we do not
hold, that other courts should conclude our more recent cases have, by implication, overruled
an earlier precedent. We reaffirm that ‘[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in
a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of
Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative
of overruling its own decisions.’” (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989))).
20. See, e.g., Rouse v. Berry, 680 F. Supp. 2d 233, 236 n.3 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Twombly
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But, of course, there may be debate about precisely what
Swierkiewicz stands for. Its broadest reading is that a plaintiff who
has pled a specific adverse employment action and alleged that the
employer acted because of a prohibited trait has satisfied Rule 8,
and therefore the allegation of discriminatory intent must be taken
as true.21 A narrower view is that Swierkiewicz holds merely that an
allegation that a plaintiff was treated worse than an identified
comparator outside his protected class suffices.22 In other words,
there is both a broad and a narrow reading of Swierkiewicz, and it

explicitly disavowed any retreat from Swierkiewicz, and Iqbal did not even discuss
Swierkiewicz, much less disavow it.” (internal citation omitted)); Desrouleaux v. Quest
Diagnostics, Inc., No. 09-61672-CIV-COHN/SELTZER, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123809, at *3-4
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2009) (“Because neither Twombly nor Iqbal involved Title VII or Section
1981 claims, this Court will continue to follow Swierkiewicz in the employment discrimination
context.”); Gillman v. Inner City Broad. Corp., No. 08 Civ. 8909 (LAP), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
85479, at *11-13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009) (“Iqbal was not meant to displace Swierkiewicz’s
teachings about pleading standards for employment discrimination claims because in
Twombly, which heavily informed Iqbal, the Supreme Court explicitly affirmed the vitality
of Swierkiewicz.”); see also Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly Is the Logical Extension of the
Mathews v. Eldridge Test to Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1, 28 (2010) (noting that, although
some lower courts have interpreted Twombly as overruling Swierkiewicz, “this interpretation
seems highly implausible, given that just five years separated the two cases; that Twombly’s
author joined the Swierkiewicz opinion; that Swierkiewicz’s author joined the Twombly
majority; and that five of the seven Justices on the Court for both cases joined both opinions”);
Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths About Twombly-Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1337, 1345
(2010) (describing as “incorrect” those courts that view Swierkiewicz as overruled: “There is
no inconsistency between rejecting heightened fact pleading and adopting nonconclusory-andplausible pleading, because the two are different systems: the former requires factual detail,
while the latter tests for factual convincingness.”).
21. See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1341 (2010)
(“The Swierkiewicz complaint states that the defendant terminated the plaintiff ’s employment. Once that transactional core is adequately identified, certain qualities or characteristics
of those events can permissibly be described with what one might call conclusory language.”).
This would parallel the way that the allegation of “negligence” must be taken as true under
Form 11. See infra text accompanying note 103.
22. Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 490
n.87 (2010) [hereinafter Hartnett, Taming Twombly] (arguing that the Court did not accept
as true the plaintiff ’s allegation of discriminatory intent in Swierkiewicz but rather accepted
as adequate a pleading that alleged that the defendant favored a less qualified worker of
another national origin and younger age); see also David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal,
99 GEO. L.J. 117, 145 (2010) (finding sufficient facts alleged in Swierkiewicz to raise a
plausible inference of discrimination); Joseph A. Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
179, 194 (2010) [hereinafter Seiner, After Iqbal] (“While there may be some legitimate concern
about the validity of Swierkiewicz generally, the decision should be considered good law at
least as to cases brought under Title VII.”).
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may be that plausible pleading leaves at least the narrow, and
perhaps the broad, reading intact.23
All of this may explain the rather confused status of Swierkiewicz.
Between Twombly and Iqbal, some courts reaffirmed Swierkiewicz,24
but since Iqbal, the support has dwindled. Shepard’s Citations
Service now places a red warning sign on Swierkiewicz,25 although
the actual court opinions are at least somewhat more circumspect—
often at the risk of obfuscation. For example, the Third Circuit,
looking to the treatment of the seminal notice pleading case, Conley
v. Gibson,26 found that “because Conley has been specifically repudiated by both Twombly and Iqbal, so too has Swierkiewicz, at least
insofar as it concerns pleading requirements and relies on Conley.”27
Swierkiewicz obviously “concerns pleading requirements”; indeed,
it concerns nothing else, and it relies on Conley.28 So does the Third
Circuit view Swierkiewicz as overruled or as retaining some undefined residual value?29
As we will see, commentators who seek to tame Twombly and
Iqbal take a more positive view of the vitality of Swierkiewicz; they
typically pitch their arguments in part on the fact that the Court’s
having left their reading of Swierkiewicz untouched.30 But there are
23. Swierkiewicz was not uniformly applied in the lower courts even before Twombly. A.
Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52 HOW. L.J. 99, 12021 (2008) (noting that a number of courts post-Swierkiewicz “maintained or reverted to some
form of particularized fact-pleading”).
24. E.g., Lindsay v. Yates, 498 F.3d 434, 439-40 (6th Cir. 2007).
25. LexisNexis Shepard’s Citation Service Summary for Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534
U.S. 506 (2002) (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).
26. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
27. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). A sprinkling of district
courts outside the Third Circuit take a similar view. E.g., Hughes v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 594
F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1240 (D. Colo. 2009). But Fowler itself found the complaint before it
sufficient, and it has been argued that the court’s analysis is more consistent with notice
pleading than the new plausibility requirement. Steinman, supra note 21, at 1345.
28. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, 514 (2002).
29. Another circuit applied Swierkiewicz to reject the argument that the plaintiff ’s failure
to plead a prima facie case required dismissal of her complaint of national origin
discrimination. Dolgaleva v. Va. Beach City Pub. Sch., 364 F. App’x 820, 827 (4th Cir. 2010).
The decision is consistent with the view that the plaintiff must plead a McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case or facts supporting another proof structure.
30. E.g., Hartnett, Taming Twombly, supra note 22, at 502 n.128 (acknowledging “serious
tension” between the opinions, but arguing that “reconciliation is possible,” in part because
Swierkiewicz rejected any requirement of pleading a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case
when other kinds of proof structures operate under the statute); Seiner, After Iqbal, supra
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other commentators who see a profound and irreconcilable tension
between Iqbal and Swierkiewicz. They believe that the former sub
silentio overruled the latter and that the Supreme Court will
ultimately recognize this logic.31
The ultimate interplay between Twombly/Iqbal and Swierkiewicz
remains to be finally resolved in the courts, or, perhaps, in
Congress, which has considered various bills to effect a return to the
pre-Twombly/Iqbal days of notice pleading32—although, perhaps
tellingly, there is no agreement on what language would achieve
this goal.33
This Article, however, takes a different tack. Several scholars
have warned that plausible pleading poses a particular threat to
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases,34 and I assume for
note 22, at 194 (“While there may be some legitimate concern about the validity of
Swierkiewicz generally, the decision should be considered good law at least as to cases
brought under Title VII.”); see also Noll, supra note 22, at 4 (“Courts will have to grapple with
the many interpretative questions Iqbal leaves open.”). See Part II for a discussion of
attempts to tame Twombly after Iqbal.
31. E.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 476 (2008)
[hereinafter Spencer, Plausibility Pleading] (“The plausibility pleading standard announced
by the Court in Twombly is no different from the Second Circuit’s heightened pleading
standard that the Court rejected in Swierkiewicz.”); see also Suzanna Sherry, Foundational
Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 145, 183 (“It would not be surprising if,
within a few years, the Court consigns Swierkiewicz to the same earned retirement to which
it relegated Conley.”).
Some commentators see a potential upside for employment discrimination plaintiffs if
plausible pleading is extended beyond complaints to defendants asserting affirmative defenses. See Melanie A. Goff & Richard A. Bales, “Plausible” Defense: Applying Twombly and Iqbal
to Affirmative Defenses, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract_id=1737805; Joseph A. Seiner, Twombly, Iqbal, and the Affirmative Defense
(Dec. 6, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id= 1721062.
These include the bona fide occupational qualification defense to sex discrimination, see
generally CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & LAUREN M. WALTER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW &
PRACTICE § 3.05 (2008), and the employer’s reasonable efforts defense to respondeat superior
liability for sexual harassment, id. § 7.07[F].
32. Senator Arlen Specter reacted to Iqbal by sponsoring the Notice Pleading Restoration
Act, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009). A hearing by the Senate Judiciary Committee on December
2, 2009, explored this issue. Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Iqbal Hearing].
33. See Edward A. Hartnett, Responding to Twombly and Iqbal: Where Do We Go from
Here?, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 24 (2010), http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_95_
Hartnett.pdf (critiquing various proposed legislative overrides and proposing another).
34. See Iqbal Hearing, supra note 32, at 12-13 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank,
Professor, University of Pennsylvania), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-0209%20Burbank%20Testimony.pdf; Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly
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purposes of analysis the discrimination plaintiff ’s worst-case
scenario, which is that Twombly and Iqbal overrule Swierkiewicz,
and that the more extreme possible meanings of “plausible pleading” are the governing standard for such cases.35 In employment
discrimination cases, that means that in order to survive a motion
to dismiss, the plaintiff would have to plead not merely that intent
to discriminate was a motivating factor for a particular adverse
employment action, but also additional facts that would make such
an allegation plausible.36 For example, under this hypothesis, the
plaintiff might avoid dismissal by alleging facts that would, if
proven, constitute a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas
standard,37 Swierkiewicz’s rejection of any such requirement notwithstanding.38

and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556-57, 608-09, 630 (2010) (finding that
district courts are dismissing complaints at a significantly greater rate after Iqbal and that
the dismissal rate of Title VII suits increased from 42 percent pre-Twombly to 53 percent postIqbal); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
517, 519-20 (2010); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading
Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1029-31
[hereinafter Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly] (finding higher dismissal rates for Title VII
cases after Twombly); Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal,
and the Paradox of Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905, 923-24 n.119 (2010). But see REPORT OF
THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 2-3 (2010) (reporting a substantial increase in grants
of motions to dismiss in the nine months after Twombly as compared to the nine months
before, but not reaching a conclusion as to the reason); Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability,
51 B.C. L. REV. 95, 97, 117-18 (2010) [hereinafter Seiner, Pleading Disability] (finding little
evidence of greater dismissal rates of ADA cases but also substantial confusion in the lower
courts about the effect of the new pleading approach to disability cases).
35. An even more extreme possible application of plausible pleading for some
discrimination cases is raised by Brian S. Clarke, Grossly Restricted Pleading: How
Twombly/Iqbal, Gross, and the Assumption of Truth Rule Could Kill Compound Employment
Discrimination Claims, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 2), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1667067 (“In compound employment discrimination claims, the facts
pled to satisfy Twombly/Iqbal, accepted as true, likely render any claim requiring but-for
causation facially implausible.”).
36. See infra text accompanying note 147.
37. See Chacko v. Worldwide Flight Servs., Inc., No. 08-CV-2363 (NGG) (JO), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9103, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2010) (“The elements of a prima facie
discrimination claim are nonetheless relevant to the determination of whether a complaint
provides a defendant with fair notice and contains ‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009))).
38. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002).
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But that may not be the only way to escape the more extreme
applications of Twombly/Iqbal. Beyond pleading a prima facie case,
I explore three other ways to do so: (1) pleading “direct evidence” of
discrimination;39 (2) pleading the existence of a “comparator”;40 and
(3) most radically, pleading not merely “adjudicative facts,” those
facts unique to the particular dispute that triggered the lawsuit, but
also “legislative facts,” the kind of more generalized factual predicates that will “nudge[ ] ... claims across the line from conceivable
to plausible” as Twombly/Iqbal require.41
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I sketches the shift from
notice pleading to plausible pleading. Part II describes the scholarly
reaction to Twombly and Iqbal, including the efforts to tame
plausible pleading in various ways. Part III details the worst-case
scenario for employment discrimination pleading, and then Part IV
offers a solution.
Before beginning, two preliminary notes are in order. First,
Twombly and Iqbal are in some ways different cases,42 and the
reference to them as a single entity is for convenience only. Where
differences are relevant to the argument, they are identified.
Second, despite my use of the term “plausible pleading” as distinct
from “notice pleading,” neither Twombly nor Iqbal purported to do
away with notice pleading; they claim to be simply refining the
meaning of Rule 8, not to be rejecting prior authority, with the exception of “retiring” dicta from Conley v. Gibson.43 Indeed, Twombly

39. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
40. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
41. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see infra Part IV.D (discussing
this approach). The phrase was repeated in Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
42. Justices Souter and Breyer obviously thought so: both joined the majority in Twombly
but dissented in Iqbal. Justice Souter, who had written Twombly, believed that Iqbal went
beyond Twombly in failing to analyze the complaint as a whole in terms of putting the
defendant on notice. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting). Souter also critiqued the
majority in Iqbal as applying the probability requirement that he had explicitly rejected in
Twombly. Id. at 1960 (“Here, by contrast [with Twombly], the allegations in the complaint are
neither confined to naked legal conclusions nor consistent with legal conduct.”). See generally
Hatamyar, supra note 34, at 577 (“[Iqbal] espoused an extraordinary interpretation of
Twombly.”); Luke Meier, Why Twombly is Good Law (But Poorly Drafted) and Iqbal Will Be
Overturned (Jan. 4, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id
=1734791.
43. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563; infra notes 74-78, 149 and accompanying text.
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explicitly endorsed Conley’s “fair notice” standard.44 Those who are
trying to limit the more radical implications of Twombly/Iqbal
naturally stress commonalities, not differences. But, because this is
a worst-case scenario Article, it seems both clearer and more efficient to stress the differences between notice pleading as traditionally understood and at least the more extreme possibilities of
plausible pleading.
I. FROM NOTICE PLEADING TO PLAUSIBLE PLEADING
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, in
addition to alleging jurisdiction and demanding relief, a complaint
need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”45 The core concept is that the
plaintiff need merely give notice of the factual setting giving rise to
her claim and notice of the legal rights implicated. This seemed to
be the message of the official forms, which, by virtue of Rule 84, are
sufficient to plead a claim.46 The standard example is Form 11,
which in its current version approves a pleading that “the defendant
negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff,” with the
only other factual detail being the time and place of the accident.47
44. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
45. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b).
46. See id. (“The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the
simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.”).
47. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11 (before the restyling of the Rules, Form 9). Similarly, Form
10 allows a complaint for goods sold and delivered without identifying the goods. FED. R. CIV.
P. Form 10. Form 18 has a very barebones allegation of patent infringement: the defendant
has infringed the identified patent “by making, selling, and using electric motors that embody
the patented invention.” FED. R. CIV. P. Form 18. This allegation does not specify when or
where the infringement occurred nor identify the infringing items. Id.
Professor Edward Hartnett, however, argues that the restyled version of the Forms
removes some of the detail of the original Form 9, and therefore removes the context which
might make the claim more plausible. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, supra note 22, at 494
n.102 (“To the extent that the allegations in [original] Form 9 concerning the place of the
collision (a public highway and not, for example, a racetrack) and the plaintiff’s actions are
significant, Restyled Form 11 may provide another illustration of the unintended
consequences of the Restyling Project.”).
Professor Hartnett also argues that Rule 8 and Rule 12(b)(6) have different purposes. That
a complaint may be formally sufficient under the former does not mean that it is substantively
sufficient under the latter. Id. at 496 n.108. With respect to Form 11 itself, for example, he
argues that a claim being stated depends on state law recognizing the tort of negligence.
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Although “heightened pleading” is required by the Federal Rules
for a few specific kinds of claims,48 the standard for “normal”
pleading was, prior to Twombly/Iqbal, generally considered to be
remarkably undemanding of the plaintiff.49 This permissive
approach was in part a reaction to the complexities of prior pleading
regimes50 and in part recognition that some of the functions
formerly played by pleading could be dispensed with in light of the
Federal Rules’ signature innovation of discovery for all civil cases.51
In short, discovery would allow for the factual development that had
previously been one role of pleading.52
Conley v. Gibson was the high-water mark of notice pleading.53 It
approved “the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.”54 Although as many have pointed
out, it was hard to take this statement literally.55 The very extremity of the formulation reinforced the holding of Conley: the plaintiffs
adequately pled a violation of the duty of fair representation under
the Railway Labor Act by alleging they “were discharged wrongfully
by the Railroad and that the Union, acting according to plan,
refused to protect their jobs as it did those of white employees or to
help them with their grievances all because they were Negroes.”56

48. For allegations of “fraud or mistake,” Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff to “state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). The
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act also requires heightened pleading with respect to
“any private action” arising from the Securities Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006); see
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165 (2008) (observing
that “the PSLRA ... imposed heightened pleading requirements”).
49. See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
50. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 437-40 (1986) (describing the Federal Rules as a reaction
to the perceived failures of the Field Code).
51. Id. at 440 (“Rather than dwell on pleading niceties, under the new system litigants
were to use the expanded discovery mechanisms provided by the Federal Rules to get to the
merits of the case.”).
52. Id.
53. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
54. Id. at 45-46.
55. E.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV.
1749, 1750 (1998).
56. Conley, 355 U.S. at 46.
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The Court explicitly rejected the defendants’ argument that more
specific allegations were necessary:
The decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts
upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules
require is “a short and plain statement of the claim” that will
give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff ’s claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests. The illustrative forms appended
to the Rules plainly demonstrate this.57

The Conley approach to notice pleading was sustained at the
Supreme Court for at least fifty years. For example, in Leatherman
v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, the
Court cited Conley’s “decisive answer” language in rejecting a circuit court’s requirement of heightened pleading in § 1983 cases
seeking to hold a municipality liable for civil rights violations.58
Furthermore, Swierkiewicz rejected any requirement that the plaintiff plead a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell
Douglas formula in order to survive a motion to dismiss.59
Then came Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, where, for the first
time, the Court introduced plausibility into the Rule 12(b)(6)
analysis, speaking of “[t]he need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) [the claim]
reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the ‘plain

57. Id. at 47. The Court explained:
Such simplified “notice pleading” is made possible by the liberal opportunity for
discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the Rules to disclose
more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly
the disputed facts and issues. Following the simple guide of Rule 8(f) that “all
pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice,” we have no doubt
that petitioners’ complaint adequately set forth a claim and gave the
respondents fair notice of its basis. The Federal Rules reject the approach that
pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to
the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate
a proper decision on the merits.
Id. at 47-48.
58. 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
59. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002); infra notes 167-71 and
accompanying text.
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statement’ possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled
to relief.’”60
Twombly was an antitrust case, and the core claim was that the
defendants—the “Baby Bells”—conspired to create barriers to entry
by others and not to compete in each other’s markets.61 There was
no doubt that such a conspiracy would have violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act,62 and the complaint alleged that the defendants had
not competed.63 However, a violation of the antitrust laws requires
not merely a failure to compete but also an agreement not to do so.
“Conscious parallelism” is not a violation.64 Plaintiffs pled such
parallelism but also pled that the defendants had in fact conspired.65
The Court was not persuaded: “[T]he complaint leaves no doubt that
plaintiffs rest their § 1 claim on descriptions of parallel conduct and
not on any independent allegation of actual agreement.”66 It ac60. 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). Twombly generated a dissent by Justice Stevens, joined in
large part by Justice Ginsburg. Stevens viewed the majority’s decision as a “dramatic
departure from settled procedural law.” Id. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting). While the costs
of antitrust litigation and the possibility of jury confusion,
merit careful case management, including strict control of discovery, careful
scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment stage, and lucid instructions to
juries; they do not, however, justify the dismissal of an adequately pleaded
complaint without even requiring the defendants to file answers denying a
charge that they in fact engaged in collective decisionmaking. More importantly,
they do not justify an interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
that seems to be driven by the majority’s appraisal of the plausibility of the
ultimate factual allegation rather than its legal sufficiency.
Id. See generally Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2010)
(arguing that an appropriate response to new pleading standards is a new approach to
discovery, which he describes as “pre-discovery discovery”).
61. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550-51.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
63. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551.
64. See generally John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic Authority and the Limits
of Expertise in Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 675 (2005) (“Game theory suggests
that competitors may be able to raise prices to supra-competitive levels without overt
communication or explicit agreement simply by taking each other’s anticipated reactions into
account in setting their own prices. This phenomenon is variously labeled interdependent
pricing, oligopolistic interdependence, tacit collusion, and conscious parallelism.... The courts,
however, have been unwilling to allow juries to infer the existence of unlawful agreements
solely on the basis of parallel behavior.”); see also Alvin K. Klevorick & Issa B. KohlerHausmann, The Plausibility of Twombly: Proving Horizontal Agreements after Twombly, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW (Einer Elhauge ed.,
forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571632.
65. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550.
66. Id. at 564.
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knowledged that “in form a few stray statements speak directly of
agreement,” but held that “on fair reading[,] these are merely legal
conclusions resting on the prior allegations.”67 Because only parallel
conduct was pled, the complaint did not plausibly suggest a violation.68
When the Court issued its opinion, Twombly could be read
narrowly in a number of ways.69 First, it was arguable that the
Court merely held that the plaintiffs had overpleaded. Despite the
“legal conclusions” dressed up as factual allegations, the complaint
made clear that the plaintiff ’s case rested entirely on parallel
conduct, and economic theory indicated that potential competitors
often act similarly without an agreement.70 Secondly, the Court
stressed the substantial costs of discovery in antitrust cases.71
Despite the transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules,72 some
thought, or hoped, that Twombly might merely be an “antitrust
pleading” decision rather than one more generally applicable.73

67. Id.
68. Id. at 564, 570.
69. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court
Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 877 (2009) [hereinafter Bone, Pleading Rules] (“Twombly does
not alter pleading rules in as drastic a way as many of its critics, and even some of its few
defenders, suppose.”).
70. In this regard, Twombly is reminiscent of Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 595 (1986), where, in the summary judgment context, the Court
rejected an antitrust claim of predatory pricing because economic theory indicated that such
conduct would not be rational. See generally Edward Brunet, The Substantive Origins of
“Plausible Pleadings”: An Introduction to the Symposium on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1, 9 (2010).
71. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (“Th[e] potential [discovery] expense is obvious enough in
the present case: plaintiffs represent a putative class of at least 90 percent of all subscribers
to local telephone or high-speed Internet service in the continental United States, in an action
against America’s largest telecommunications firms (with many thousands of employees
generating reams and gigabytes of business records) for unspecified (if any) instances of
antitrust violations that allegedly occurred over a period of seven years.”).
72. Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L.
REV. 535, 541 (“One of the foundational assumptions of modern American procedure is that
the Rules Enabling Act’s reference to ‘general rules’ forecloses the promulgation of different
prospective rules for cases that involve different bodies of substantive law.”). But see
Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 988 (2003)
(“From antitrust to environmental litigation, conspiracy to copyright, substance specific areas
of law are riddled with requirements of particularized fact-based pleading.”).
73. E.g., Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117 (2007).
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These and other attempts to limit Twombly nevertheless had to
confront not only the Court’s explicit rejection of the Conley v.
Gibson “no conceivable set of facts” dictum74 but also its introduction
of a plausibility requirement. Although tailored to the antitrust
claim before it, the Court’s language in Twombly certainly suggested
a broader approach:
[W]e hold that stating [a § 1] claim requires a complaint with
enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an
agreement was made. Asking for plausible grounds to infer an
agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the
pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement.... [Based on precedent and a number of economic
authorities, it] makes sense to say, therefore, that an allegation
of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not
suffice. Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality.75

As the italicized language suggests, the opinion was remarkable not
in its requirement that the elements of the antitrust claim be pled
but rather in its suggestion that “bare assertions” and “conclusory
allegations” are insufficient pleading.
Nevertheless, the Twombly Court seemed to go out of its way to
leave Swierkiewicz intact. In fact, it expressly rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the Twombly analysis “runs counter to
Swierkiewicz.”76 The Court then described its earlier decision as
reversing the Second Circuit because it had “impermissibly applied

74. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (“[A]fter puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous
observation has earned its retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative
gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be
supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”).
75. Id. at 556-57 (emphases added). A number of commentators have noted the coupling
of a plausibility requirement with the disclaimer of a probability test. E.g., Bone, Pleading
Rules, supra note 69, at 881 (“‘Plausible’ corresponds to a probability greater than ‘possible.’
Exactly how much greater is uncertain.”); Hatamyar, supra note 34, at 571 (“Apparently,
‘plausible’ is more than ‘possible’ but less than ‘probable.’”); Noll, supra note 22, at 22 (“[I]t
would seem that the Court is asking for, at most, something like probable cause to believe the
defendant breached a legal duty owed to the plaintiff.”).
76. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 (denying that “our analysis runs counter to Swierkiewicz”).
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what amounted to a heightened pleading requirement.”77 In
contrast, Twombly did not “require heightened fact pleading of
specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”78
Despite this reassurance, those who thought that plausible
pleading might be limited and perhaps applicable merely to the
antitrust arena had their hopes dashed by Iqbal, which not only
stressed the transsubstantive nature of Twombly but also sharpened its analysis.79 Iqbal, who had been detained in the wake of the
September 11 terrorist attacks, claimed to have been subjected to
especially harsh incarceration because of his religion and nationality.80 That is, he claimed that his conditions were imposed because
he was Arab and Muslim.81 At first glance, this would seem pretty
plausible—the September 11 attacks orchestrated by al-Qaeda
relied on recruits who were Arab and Muslim,82 and it was widely
recognized that the counterterrorist response focused on members
of these groups.83 But understanding the legal basis for Iqbal’s suit
requires a more nuanced approach to the claim he was making.
The plaintiff brought a Bivens claim, that is, a challenge to the
actions of federal officials on the ground that they violated the
plaintiff ’s constitutional rights.84 The constitutional rights in question were equal protection, under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, and free exercise of religion. A violation of those
rights requires the violator to have the requisite intent:85 “Under
extant precedent purposeful discrimination requires more than
‘intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.’ It instead
involves a decisionmaker’s undertaking a course of action ‘because
of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ [the action’s] adverse effects upon an
identifiable group.”86
77. Id. at 570.
78. Id.; see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citing
Swierkiewicz post-Twombly for the proposition that “when ruling on a defendant’s motion to
dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint”).
79. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1973, 1950 (2009).
80. Id. at 1942.
81. Id. at 1951.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1952.
84. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
85. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952.
86. Id. at 1948 (quoting Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
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That meant that the defendants must have acted “not for a
neutral, investigative reason but for the purpose of discriminating
on account of race, religion, or national origin.”87 To be liable, therefore, the defendants must have subjected the plaintiff to especially
difficult conditions of incarceration because he was Arab or
Muslim.88 Further, it was necessary for each defendant— including
the Attorney General John Ashcroft and the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation Robert Mueller—to have had this intent in
order for that defendant’s conduct to be actionable under Bivens.89
Merely approving the actions of a subordinate who possessed that
intent was not enough.90
As the case reached the Court, the only question was whether
Ashcroft and Mueller were proper defendants. The Court reasoned
that, although it might have been plausible that lower-level officials
acted from inappropriate motives, it was not plausible that Ashcroft
and Mueller did so.91 For these top-level officials, other motives—
such as a desire to protect national security by keeping “suspected
terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the suspects
could be cleared of terrorist activity”—were more apparent.92 The
87. Id. at 1949.
88. Id. at 1952.
89. Id. at 1948.
90. The dissenters in Iqbal viewed the majority as entirely eliminating supervisory
liability despite the defendants’ concessions that they would be liable if they had actual
knowledge of subordinate discrimination and were deliberately indifferent to it; they also
critiqued the Court as so doing without full briefing. Id. at 1954-55 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(“This case is here on the uncontested assumption that [Bivens] allows personal liability based
on a federal officer’s violation of an individual’s rights under the First and Fifth Amendments,
and it comes to us with the explicit concession of petitioners Ashcroft and Mueller that an
officer may be subject to Bivens liability as a supervisor on grounds other than respondeat
superior. The Court apparently rejects this concession and, although it has no bearing on the
majority’s resolution of this case, does away with supervisory liability under Bivens.”).
Whether the majority went so far is not so clear, but the Court at least rejected respondeat
superior liability and liability for merely knowing of a subordinate’s unconstitutional actions.
Id. at 1949 (majority opinion) (“[Plaintiff] believes a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his
subordinate’s discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor’s violating the Constitution.
We reject this argument.”). Further, as Professor Hartnett notes, the Iqbal Court’s rejection
of supervisory liability and the requirement of “purpose rather than knowledge” for Bivens
liability “is a crucial step in concluding that the Iqbal complaint was insufficient. Nowhere
does the majority in Iqbal state that it would be implausible to infer that Attorney General
Ashcroft knew about, but did nothing to stop, the actions of his subordinates.” Hartnett,
Taming Twombly, supra note 22, at 497.
91. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952.
92. Id. The relevant allegation was that the two defendants adopted a policy approving

1632

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1613

Court therefore concluded that Ashcroft and Mueller were not
proper defendants.93
The result in Iqbal could have been justified by the need to provide more elbow room for law enforcement in dealing with terrorism. Indeed, the Court has been generally sympathetic to immunity
for government officials,94 and the case could have followed Twombly
and imposed tightened pleading requirements where the substantive law concerns made that appropriate. Twombly, then, would
have required heightened pleading for antitrust cases whereas Iqbal
would do so when high level government officials were sued.95
Although that approach might have been hard to square with either
the text of Rule 8 or the transsubstantive nature of the Federal
Rules generally, it would have done less damage to notice pleading
across the board. The Court, however, explicitly disclaimed any such
reading and affirmed that the pleading standard it adopted applied
to all cases.96
The Iqbal opinion essentially sets out an analytic structure that
suggests that a court analyze a complaint under “[t]wo working
principles.”97 Drawing on Twombly, Iqbal requires a court deciding
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to identify the “factual” allegations, as distinct from legal conclusions in a complaint.98 “Facts” pled must be
taken as true, but allegations that do not state “facts” need not be
credited: “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclu“‘restrictive conditions of confinement’ for post-September 11 detainees until they were
‘cleared’ by the FBI”; this “does not show, or even intimate, that petitioners purposefully
housed detainees in the ADMAX SHU due to their race, religion, or national origin.” Id.
93. Id.
94. See generally Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229,
230 (2006) (“[T]he Court regularly and emphatically declares that the issue of qualified
immunity is a pure question of law, and that qualified immunity claims can and should be
resolved at the earliest stages of litigation. Its devotion to these principles is driven by what
has emerged as the primary policy justification for qualified immunity—limiting the social
costs of civil rights claims against public officials.”).
95. Burbank, supra note 72, at 558.
96. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953. Some have suggested that concerns from Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), might justify application of more liberal state pleading
requirements in diversity cases. Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What
Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
245, 330 (2008).
97. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
98. Id.
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sions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”99 Elsewhere,
the majority, quoting Twombly, reaffirmed that “a plaintiff ’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief ’ requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.”100
Obviously, what counts as a “fact” as opposed to a legal conclusion
is key to understanding this first prong of Iqbal, and much of the
criticism of the case has focused on this aspect.101 For example, is a
complaint that identifies the time and place of an automobile
accident and then asserts that the defendant was driving “negligently” an allegation of fact or a legal conclusion dependent on other
facts that have not been alleged? As we have seen, Form 11
approves pleading a negligence claim essentially by identifying the
time and place of the incident and adding “negligently” to describe
it.102 Form 11 does not demand any more specificity with regard to
what made the defendant’s conduct negligent. But after Iqbal it is
hard to see why “negligence” is not a mere “legal conclusion,” a
“threadbare recital” of one element of the negligence cause of
action.103
Once the facts alleged are identified, the second Iqbal step is to
determine whether, accepting such allegations as true, the “complaint ... states a plausible claim for relief.”104 Quoting heavily from
Twombly, the Court explained:
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
101. Clermont, supra note 20, at 1350 (“As everyone is now realizing, the determination
of conclusoriness remains an unclear and undeniably subjective step.”).
102. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11; supra note 47 and accompanying text.
103. While commentators view Twombly/Iqbal as focusing on legal rather than factual
sufficiency, or, as one commentator has noted, legal rather than factual plausibility, see
Kilaru, supra note 34, at 910, it is precisely at the point of identifying what counts as a fact
that the distinction blurs.
104. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
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a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a
complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a
defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’”105

This is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”106
Unlike Twombly, the Iqbal majority did not cite Swierkiewicz, an
omission which might indicate a retreat from the Twombly approval
or just indicate that the majority did not see Swierkiewicz as
relevant to the case. The latter, however, seems a little odd given
that both Iqbal and Swierkiewicz involved pleading what Title VII
would describe as individual disparate treatment.107
It should be immediately apparent that, Swierkiewicz aside,
application of Twombly/Iqbal to the employment discrimination
context raises serious questions in terms of both prongs, pleading
“facts” and the plausibility of the resultant claim. A plaintiff could
easily plead the employment-related harm that was done to him,108
but would a further allegation that the action was taken as a result
of discriminatory motivations be merely “conclusory” or more like
the allegation of “negligence” in Form 11? If the former, must the
plaintiff plead a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case or something
else in order to show more than “a mere possibility” that the
plaintiff is entitled to relief? Swierkiewicz explicitly holds not,109 but
does Swierkiewicz survive Twombly/Iqbal?

105. Id. at 1949 (internal citations to Twombly omitted). The Court reiterated this
plausibility requirement later: “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not
‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 1950 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (a)(2)).
106. Id. at 1950.
107. There are, of course, substantial differences. Whereas Bivens focuses on individual
liability and rejects supervisory or entity liability, Title VII does just the opposite: only the
employer, not the agent, may be liable for discrimination. E.g., Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc.,
159 F.3d 177, 181-82 (4th Cir. 1998) (Title VII). See generally SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note
31, § 1.06[D]; Rebecca Hanner White, Vicarious and Personal Liability for Employment
Discrimination, 30 GA. L. REV. 509 (1996).
108. See infra text accompanying notes 142-43.
109. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510, 515 (2002).
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II. REACTIONS TO TWOMBLY AND IQBAL
The scholarly community reacted strongly to Twombly and Iqbal
as numerous commentators attempted not merely to understand
and critique the decisions110 but also to “tame” them.111 The critiques
are sweeping. Process-oriented commentators argue that, whether
or not the resulting rule is optimal, it constitutes a sub silentio
amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather than a
mere interpretation of them.112 This view finds the Iqbal approach
illegitimate as a violation of the balance between Congress and the
Court struck by the Rules Enabling Act.113 Short-circuiting the
amendment process also meant that the Court lacked sources of
information critical to assessing the wisdom of the new regime.
Beyond the procedural critiques are the substantive criticisms.
For example, there are those who argue that the new pleading
regime will inappropriately restrict access to the courts for those
who lack the resources to investigate claims without the benefits of
discovery.114 Others point out that, especially for civil rights claims,
which typically require intent, the critical information to ascertaining the defendant’s state of mind is necessarily unavailable without
discovery.115 Still others contend that, whatever the abstract merits
110. E.g., Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note 69; Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly: The
Demise of Notice Pleading, the Triumph of Milton Handler, and the Uncertain Future of
Private Antitrust Enforcement, 28 REV. LITIG. 1 (2008); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C.
Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2010) [hereinafter
Clermont & Yeazell, Inventing Tests]; Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP.
L. REV. 1063 (2009).
111. E.g., Hartnett, Taming Twombly, supra note 22.
112. See Iqbal Hearing, supra note 32, at 1 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank, Professor,
University of Pennsylvania) (“[A]ny such change should be effected by amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, by statute, or by some combination of the rulemaking and
legislative processes.”).
113. For that reason, heightened pleading requirements imposed by Congress in the
Private Securities Law Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006), do not pose the same legitimacy
problems even if they tend to discourage access to the courts as does Iqbal. See Tellabs, Inc.
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading
After Tellabs, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 507.
114. Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 31, at 433.
115. Roy L. Brooks, Conley and Twombly: A Critical Race Theory Perspective, 52 HOW. L.J.
31, 58 (2008) (“[E]vidence of discriminatory animus ... is typically not revealed to the plaintiff
until discovery.”); Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal
Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS &
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of the Iqbal approach, it is too indeterminate to yield consistent
results in the lower courts.116 Indeed, its explicit reliance on “judicial
experience and common sense”117 of district judges guarantees that
similar cases will be treated differently. The various critics draw
heavily on the history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
arguing that the new rule violates the original intent regarding
notice pleading and threatens to replicate the problems with prior
pleading regimes that the Federal Rules sought to eliminate.118
Many critiques tend to read the Twombly/Iqbal rule as a u-turn
for pleading,119 a view that is shared even by some who applaud the
decisions.120 But other scholars, although sensitive to these kinds of

CLARK L. REV. 65, 82 (2010) (“At this early juncture in the litigation, legal conclusions may
be the best a plaintiff can offer when the requisite proof of plausibility is in the exclusive
possession of the defendant and can only be revealed via discovery.”); Schneider, supra note
34, at 519 (“[T]he greatest impact of this change in the landscape of federal pretrial practice
is the dismissal of civil rights and employment discrimination cases from federal courts in
disproportionate numbers.”); Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil
Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 159, 179-80 (2000).
116. Malveaux, supra note 115, at 92 (“Where a judge has only his ‘judicial experience and
common sense’ to guide him when determining the plausibility of an intentional
discrimination claim pre-discovery, there is the risk of unpredictability, lack of uniformity,
and confusion.”); Wasserman, supra note 115, at 159 (“[Iqbal will] almost certainly produc[e]
more 12(b)(6) dismissals as well as wide variance from case to case, even within the same
court.”).
117. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
118. Iqbal Hearing, supra note 32, at 4 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank, Professor,
University of Pennsylvania) (“Those who drafted the Federal Rules objected to fact pleading
because it led to wasteful disputes about distinctions—among ‘facts,’ ‘conclusions,’ and
‘evidence’—that they thought were arbitrary or metaphysical.”).
119. See Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion To Dismiss
Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 18 (2010) (arguing that plausible
pleading brings motions to dismiss closer to summary judgment motions); Suja A. Thomas,
Why the Motion To Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851, 1870 (2008)
(arguing that the plausible pleading shares similar constitutional infirmities to summary
judgment). But see Clermont, supra note 20, at 1357-59 (noting differences between the two
procedural devices).
120. See Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions To Dismiss Became
(Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 76-77 (2007) (arguing that the
realities of modern civil litigation require a different approach to pleading); see also Bone,
Pleading Rules, supra note 69, at 895 (arguing that the drafters of the Federal Rules were
pragmatists who could have endorsed the Twombly approach as an appropriate reaction to
the realities of modern litigation); Wasserman, supra note 115, at 167-74 (drawing on Thomas
Main’s work to argue that a perceived mismatch between substance and procedure explains
the Iqbal approach to pleading in civil rights cases). But see Smith, supra note 110, at 1088-89
(arguing that the new standard is mandated by the Federal Rules).
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concerns, have interpreted the opinions to be less radical121 or have
argued that other Federal Rules can contain the potential damage.
For example, Professor Edward Hartnett argues that Twombly’s
plausibility requirement can be read “as equivalent to the traditional [requirement] that a factual inference be reasonable”122 and
that federal judges can defer deciding motions to dismiss until
sufficient discovery has been had to explore the plausibility of the
allegations.123 And Professor Adam Steinman, taking “a uniquely
sanguine view,”124 argues that the plausibility question is not even
reached if “a complaint contains nonconclusory allegations for every
element of a claim for relief.”125 Under this reading, Swierkiewicz
continues to state the law.126
Nor is the adverse reaction limited to scholars. Senator Arlen
Specter introduced a bill aimed at restoring the pre-Twombly
regime, and the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the
question.127 Among others, Professor Stephen Burbank testified at
the hearings, urging an alternative statutory correction of the decisions or an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,128

121. Before Iqbal made clear the transsubstantive reach of plausible pleading, 129 S. Ct.
at 1953 (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions,’ and
it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.”), much of this effort seemed designed
to confine Twombly to the antitrust arena. E.g., Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot
Be Optimal but Could Be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital
Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 932 n.185 (2009).
122. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, supra note 22, at 474.
123. Id. at 475 (“[D]espite a widespread assumption to the contrary, discovery can proceed
during the pendency of a Twombly motion.”); see also Malveaux, supra note 115, at 69
(arguing that predismissal discovery would be aimed at “determining the lawsuit’s viability
rather than its underlying merits”) (emphasis added). Professor Hartnett also argues that “the
Twombly framework can be treated as an invitation to present information and argument
designed to dislodge a judge’s baseline assumptions about what is natural.” Hartnett, Taming
Twombly, supra note 22, at 474-75; see infra text accompanying notes 130-31. This Article in
fact is devoted to exploring one way to shift baseline assumptions in the discrimination
context.
124. Wasserman, supra note 115, at 176. Professor Wasserman finds Steinman’s approach
normatively appealing but “descriptively out of step with Iqbal.” Id.; see also Clermont, supra
note 20, at 1363 n.128 (classifying both Hartnett and Steinman, inter alia, as Iqbal optimists).
125. Steinman, supra note 21, at 1298.
126. Id. at 1322-23 (finding Swierkiewicz consistent with proper application of plausible
pleading).
127. See supra note 32.
128. Iqbal Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank, Professor, University
of Pennsylvania).
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and the number of scholarly proposals to restore what the authors
view as the proper scope of notice pleading has since grown.129
The underlying policy issue at stake in this debate lies at the
heart of civil litigation. Under the notice pleading regime as traditionally conceived, most of the work in sorting out potentially valid
claims from invalid ones occurred not in the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss context but rather at the summary judgment stage after
sometimes lengthy discovery.130 This approach to pleading tended
to ensure that the ultimate determination was made on the merits
in light of full information. Viable causes of action would not be
frustrated by the inability of the plaintiff to ascertain the relevant
facts on her own, an especially difficult task if the information were
under the control of the defendant.131
This advantage of notice pleading was, of course, also its biggest
disadvantage: the Conley regime’s subordination of pleading to
merit determinations after full discovery subjected defendants to
the burdens of discovery even for claims whose implausibility was
apparent at the outset.132
The advantages and disadvantages of Twombly/Iqbal’s plausible
pleading approach are the mirror image of those of notice pleading.
Dubious claims will be filtered out early, and the (sometimes enormous) costs of discovery will be avoided; however, claims that would
be well-founded if the plaintiff could get access to relevant information through the discovery process will also be dismissed. Depending
on an empirical assessment of how much is baby and how much is

129. See sources cited supra note 34.
130. Some have argued that the halcyon days of pre-Twombly and Iqbal notice pleading are
overstated. Although one would imagine that the official ideology of notice pleading would
mean dismissals were relatively rare, a substantial percentage of Rule 12(b)(6) motions were
granted even before Twombly. See Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly, supra note 34, at 1029
(“In the year prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, 54.5 percent of federal district court
opinions granted (in whole) motions to dismiss when citing the Conley decision.”).
131. Some kinds of discrimination cases do not turn on information as to which the
defendant has greater access than the plaintiff, and it may not be an accident that some of the
decisions finding the plaintiff ’s pleading inadequate focus on this aspect. For example, in a
harassment case, the plaintiff should be able to allege the acts that constitute the harassment
in order to allow the court to determine whether it is plausible that the conduct was
sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to be actionable. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 67 (1986); see infra note 226.
132. Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (“Indeed it may appear on the face of the
pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.”).
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bathwater, a more rigorous approach to pleading is either good or
bad policy.133 This balance has led scholars like Professors Hartnett
and Steinman to try to preserve the good of plausible pleading while
limiting the downsides.134
III. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION PLAINTIFFS’ PLAUSIBLE
PLEADING PROBLEM
Consistent with this Article’s worst-case scenario for the employment discrimination plaintiff,135 suppose Congress does not act and
that the more extreme potential implications of Twombly/Iqbal are
realized in the courts. That would mean that Swierkiewicz is overturned and that employment discrimination complaints, like all
other complaints, are subjected to “plausible pleading” requirements. Further, although Professor Hartnett has suggested that,
within the current Federal Rules, district courts can reach sensible
results even under a plausible pleading regime by deferring
decisions on motions to dismiss until after at least limited discovery,136 this avenue depends on the willingness of the district
judges to so act. At the outset of a case, a plaintiff will not know who
the judge will be nor how likely he or she is to be sympathetic to the
problems posed by Twombly/Iqbal for employment discrimination
suits. Indeed, there is strong reason to believe that such suits are
already disfavored in the federal courts,137 which suggests that
district court judges may apply plausible pleading enthusiastically.
While it is too early to be confident, there are indications that
Twombly and Iqbal have already had a significant effect on the rate

133. Clermont & Yeazell, Inventing Tests, supra note 110, at 838 (noting that the new
regime will reduce the “frequency of weakly founded suits” and “the frequency of well-founded
suits that now require the assistance of discovery to make their merits clear”).
134. See generally Hartnett, Taming Twombly, supra note 22; Steinman, supra note 21.
135. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
136. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, supra note 22, at 509-10.
137. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103 (2009); Kevin
M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in
Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004); Kevin M. Clermont et al., How
Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 547 (2003).
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of dismissals generally138 and in employment discrimination cases
in particular.139
To understand the impact of Twombly/Iqbal, it is necessary to
examine how plausible pleading might apply to a typical employment discrimination case claiming individual disparate treatment.140 Once this analysis makes clear the dangers posed to the
antidiscrimination laws by Iqbal, this Article proposes solutions
that assume the more extreme readings of Iqbal and shows how a
plaintiff may nevertheless defeat a motion to dismiss.141
The putative employment discrimination plaintiff will typically
know that he has suffered an “adverse employment action”—for
example, that he was turned down for employment, terminated, or
laid off.142 In the same way that a negligence plaintiff can plead the
138. See Hatamyar, supra note 34, at 598; Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly, supra note
34, at 1029. But see Clermont & Yeazell, Inventing Tests, supra note 110, at 839 n.66, 848 n.98
(arguing the difficulties of empirically assessing the results of plausible pleading).
139. See sources cited supra note 34.
140. This Article does not address, except in passing, how to plead other kinds of
discrimination claims, most notably systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact.
Further, there are variations on the individual disparate treatment claims that require
special treatment—for example, harassment claims and retaliation claims. See infra note 226.
Finally, pleading disability claims poses special problems. See Seiner, Pleading Disability,
supra note 34, at 136-37.
141. Infra Part IV.
142. For most lower courts, a mere showing that the employer discriminated does not
necessarily make the conduct actionable. Courts have also required an “adverse employment
action,” which they have usually defined to require some material effect on the terms and
conditions of employment. See, e.g., Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen, 496 F.3d 229, 238 (2d
Cir. 2007). Obviously, “ultimate employment decisions”—hiring and firing—suffice, McCoy
v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2007), and meaningful changes in
compensation have also been held sufficient. See Farrell v. Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 614
(7th Cir. 2005) (holding that although denial of bonuses is not an adverse employment action,
denial of a raise can be, and the denial to the plaintiff of a regularly conferred award resulting
in the recipient getting a permanent increase in base salary is best characterized as a raise).
When it comes to less direct economic effects on employees’ lives, however, the lower courts’
decisions are confused. For example, a mid-range evaluation, Primes v. Reno, 190 F.3d 765,
767 (6th Cir. 1999), or even a negative evaluation that hinders future prospects, Davis v.
Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1242-43 (11th Cir. 2001), have been found to be
nonactionable. This is also true of “lateral transfers,” usually defined to mean no reduction
in pay or title and any diminution in pay “indirect and minor,” Williams v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996), even though the transfer might be to a distant
location, Reynolds v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 454 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2006); Vann v.
Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 179 F. App’x 491, 492-98 (10th Cir. 2006). Other courts have been more
permissive, and some commentators have challenged requiring more than a change in a term,
condition, or privilege of employment. See Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination,
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date and time of the accident in Form 11, a discrimination plaintiff
can plead the date and character of the adverse employment
action.143 Under plausible pleading, this might require a little more
detail than would have been needed previously. Because not all
employment actions taken for discriminatory reasons are sufficiently serious to be actionable, the plaintiff might have to plead
more than a “conclusory” statement of “adverseness.” But this seems
not much of an imposition: a plaintiff will typically be aware of the
harm caused by the action being challenged.
What the putative plaintiff will rarely “know” is the employer’s
intent in taking the challenged action. Unlike other areas of the law,
such as breach of contract, Title VII and other antidiscrimination
statutes do not bar particular conduct—such as failure to hire or a
decision to discharge. Such actions are perfectly acceptable unless
motivated by discriminatory intent.144 Or, as Professor Suzette
47 EMORY L.J. 1121, 1151 (1998) (“Congress’s use of the phrase ‘compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment’ emphasizes the employment-related nature of the
prohibited discrimination. The phrase is better read as making clear that an employer who
discriminates against an employee in a non-job-related context would not run afoul of Title
VII, rather than as sheltering employment discrimination that does not significantly
disadvantage an employee.”) (footnote omitted).
143. In Kolupa v. Roselle Park District, 438 F.3d 713, 715 (7th Cir. 2006), the court rejected
the necessity for specific allegations not only that particular action was taken against the
plaintiff but also that those actions constituted adverse employment actions: “Whether any
given step is an adverse employment action (alone or in combination with some other act) goes
to the merits; these details may be explored in discovery, on motion for summary judgment,
and if necessary at trial, but need not be included in complaints.” Kolupa held that less
tangible adverse actions—such as warnings—were sufficient for pleading purposes. Whether
they were sufficiently adverse to be actionable could be determined in the context of the whole
case at summary judgment. Id.; see also Kassner, 496 F.3d at 240. However, these cases were
decided before plausible pleading, and one possible implication of Iqbal is that a plaintiff must
now plead the consequences of less tangible actions in order to render it plausible that the
action in question was adverse.
144. The causal relationship between the act taken and the prohibited intent varies with
the statute. Due to an amendment to Title VII in 1991, an employer is liable for discrimination if the prohibited intent was a “motivating factor” in an employment decision, even if
the employer would have made the same decision had the factor been absent. Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94-95 (2003) (stating that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006) provides
for liability when a plaintiff proves that a prohibited consideration is a motivating factor in
an employment decision even though the employer can limit its liability by carrying the
burden of showing that it would have made the same decision in any event). In contrast,
under the ADEA, the discriminatory intent must be a determinative factor, that is, a but-for
cause. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009) (“It follows, then, that under
§ 623(a)(1), the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion to establish that age was the ‘butfor’ cause of the employer’s adverse action.”). The courts have not yet definitively resolved how
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Malveaux puts it, any given decision might be based on a prohibited
characteristic or a legitimate employer concern, which makes the
factual allegation of an adverse action “consistent with two possibilities, neither of which can be confirmed at the pleading stage.”145
The plaintiff, therefore, must plead not only the harm done to her
but also the motivation. This is where the first step in Iqbal enters
the analysis: can the plaintiff survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by
simply alleging that the adverse employment action was motivated
by discrimination? Form 11 implies that the word “discriminatory”
would suffice in the same way that “negligence” suffices for the
tort.146 But Iqbal suggests the opposite—that merely pleading discriminatory motive is “conclusory,” a “formulaic recitation of the
elements of [the Title VII] cause of action.”147
Prior to Iqbal, the text of the Federal Rules seemed to offer a
basis to avoid this result. Thus, Rule 9(b) provides that “[m]alice,

this allocation of burdens plays out under the Americans with Disabilities Act or 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981. See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding
that Gross does not require burden shifts in ADA cases).
145. Malveaux, supra note 115, at 87-88.
146. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11.
147. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Professor Malveaux writes:
By discounting as implausible factual allegations because they are equally
consistent with legal and illegal behavior, the new pleading standard penalizes
plaintiffs who seek relief for invidious discrimination because they do not have
“further factual enhancement” to cross the line from possible to plausible based
on the judge’s “judicial experience and common sense.”
Malveaux, supra note 115, at 88 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 546; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
But see Seiner, Pleading Disability, supra note 34, at 136-37 (“Establishing the employer’s
discriminatory intent in a case can be the most difficult hurdle for an employee to overcome.
For purposes of pleading, however, simply alleging the causal link between the adverse action
and the disability should be sufficient to allow the case to proceed.”).
Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2010), offers support for both positions.
The majority, Judges Woods and Easterbrook, found the plaintiff stated a claim for
discrimination when a bank denied a home-equity loan, even though there seemed to be a
plausible business explanation for the bank’s actions. Id. at 405-06. The opinion relied heavily
on Swierkiewicz. Judge Posner dissented, “hav[ing] difficulty squaring” the majority’s decision
with Iqbal. Id. at 407 (Posner, J., dissenting). Although he recognized that Swierkiewicz
should still be treated as binding under stare decisis, he found it distinguishable, but he was
not so clear why. Id. at 410. Posner also viewed Iqbal’s plausibility standard as “opaque,” id.
at 411, but ultimately concluded, “when a bank turns down a loan applicant because the
appraisal of the security for the loan indicates that the loan would not be adequately secured,
the alternative hypothesis of racial discrimination does not have substantial merit; it is
implausible.” Id.
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intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be
alleged generally.”148 Whatever discriminatory intent is, it would
seem to be a “condition of a person’s mind.” But Iqbal rejected this
argument. It, of course, was a discrimination case, albeit not one
involving employment discrimination, but the Court found Rule 9(b)
unavailing:
It is true that Rule 9(b) requires particularity when pleading
“fraud or mistake,” while allowing “[m]alice, intent, knowledge,
and other conditions of a person’s mind [to] be alleged generally.” But “generally” is a relative term. In the context of Rule 9,
it is to be compared to the particularity requirement applicable
to fraud or mistake. Rule 9 merely excuses a party from pleading
discriminatory intent under an elevated pleading standard. It
does not give him license to evade the less rigid—though still
operative—strictures of Rule 8.149

Thus, the question for employment discrimination plaintiffs returns
to whether alleging an identified action as being discriminatorily
motivated suffices.
Iqbal seems to answer the question no. Of course, it might be that
the discrimination charged in Iqbal could be distinguished from
employment discrimination. One possibility is simply the source of
the right: Iqbal turned on a question of constitutional law because
the Bivens claim at issue allowed the plaintiff to sue for a violation
of the Free Exercise Clause150 and the equal protection component
of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The Court relied on
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,151 which drew a “fine distinction

148. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
149. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954.
150. Indeed, the majority questioned whether a claim of religious discrimination would lie
under Bivens but assumed so for purposes of the case. Id. at 1948 (“For while we have allowed
a Bivens action to redress a violation of the equal protection component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, we have not found an implied damages remedy under the
Free Exercise Clause.... Petitioners do not press this argument, however, so we assume,
without deciding, that respondent’s First Amendment claim is actionable under Bivens.”)
(internal citations omitted).
151. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). See generally Victor C. Romero, Interrogating Iqbal: Intent,
Inertia, and (a lack of) Imagination, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1419, 1442 (2010) (“The Court’s
retreat in Iqbal through its citation to Feeney’s purposeful intent standard betrays the legacy
of its more notable commitments to individual liberty.”).
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between different mental states”152 by holding that the foreseeability
of consequences of an employment practice was not “intentional” for
equal protection purposes.153 Rather, the actor must have desired
the result—he must have acted “at least in part ‘because of,’ not
merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”154
Although Feeney did not involve a Title VII claim,155 the line it
drew is consistent with the traditional distinction between disparate
treatment and disparate impact under that statute. Although the
consequences of an employment practice can be determinative of
disparate impact liability,156 and they may be a basis for inferring
the requisite intent, as Feeney itself recognized,157 there must be a
finding of intent in the sense of purpose to act on the basis of a prohibited characteristic for a disparate treatment violation to occur.158
152. George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested
Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2321 (2006).
153. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
154. Id.
155. Veterans’ preferences at issue in Feeney are excluded from the statute. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-11 (2006).
156. Id. § 2000e-2(k); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). See generally
SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 31, § 4. A diluted version of disparate impact liability applies
under the ADEA. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (applying the Court’s
articulation of the disparate impact theory in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989), to the ADEA, which the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not amend when it amended Title
VII to codify disparate impact under that statute); SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 31, § 4.10.
Disparate impact was somewhat revived for the ADEA by the Court’s subsequent decision in
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 554 U.S. 84, 91 (2008), which held that the
ADEA’s provision stating that it “shall not be unlawful for an employer ... to take any action
otherwise prohibited ... where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age
[RFOA],” 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1), superseded the business necessity/job relation justification
that normally applies under the disparate impact, and that the burden of persuasion as to
RFOA was on the employer. SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 31, § 4.10.
157. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 n.25 (“This is not to say that the inevitability or foreseeability
of consequences of a neutral rule has no bearing upon the existence of discriminatory intent.
Certainly, when the adverse consequences of a law upon an identifiable group are as
inevitable as the gender-based consequences of [the law at issue], a strong inference that the
adverse effects were desired can reasonably be drawn.”); see also EEOC v. Dial Corp., 469 F.3d
735, 741-42 (8th Cir. 2006) (looking to foreseeability of adverse effects in a Title VII case as
one basis to draw an inference of intent).
158. AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying Feeney to a
Title VII disparate treatment claim); see also Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton
Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making,
61 LA. L. REV. 495, 503 (2001) (“Although Feeney was a constitutional, not statutory, decision,
the judicial approach to intentional discrimination in Fourteenth Amendment claims and its
approach to intentional discrimination under Title VII has been consistent.”).
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If the legal context does not serve to distinguish Iqbal from
typical employment discrimination complaints, perhaps the factual
context justifies a different approach. In Feeney, the Court recognized that the inference of intent to discriminate might appropriately be drawn from the disparate gender impact in some circumstances, but it found that inference negated by the history of the
Massachusetts veterans’ preference.159 Perhaps Iqbal can be similarly explained. The Court stressed that there was a more plausible
alternative inference to be drawn from the only “facts” it found to
have been alleged against these defendants:
Though respondent alleges that various other defendants, who
are not before us, may have labeled him a person of “of high
interest” [sic] for impermissible reasons, his only factual
allegation against [Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director
Mueller] accuses them of adopting a policy approving “restrictive
conditions of confinement” for post-September-11 detainees until
they were “‘cleared’ by the FBI.” Accepting the truth of that
allegation, the complaint does not show, or even intimate, that
petitioners purposefully housed detainees in the ADMAX SHU
due to their race, religion, or national origin. All it plausibly
suggests is that the Nation’s top law enforcement officers, in the
aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep
suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available until
the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity. Respondent
does not argue, nor can he, that such a motive would violate
petitioners’ constitutional obligations. He would need to allege
more by way of factual content to “nudg[e]” his claim of purposeful discrimination “across the line from conceivable to
plausible.”160

Professor Michael Zimmer has argued that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ricci v.
DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009), radically changed the definition of intent under Title VII,
requiring essentially only that the employer act with knowledge of the race of the individuals
affected. Michael J. Zimmer, Ricci’s Color-Blind Standard in a Race Conscious Society: A Case
of Unintended Consequences?, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1257, 1259. If that interpretation were to be
accepted, much of the pleading problems under the antidiscrimination statutes would
disappear.
159. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275.
160. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009) (citation to the complaint omitted)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
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This analysis suggests that where alternative, more plausible
explanations are readily available to the court, the inference of a
violation is not sufficiently likely to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion.161 This reasoning is in accordance with Twombly, which can
be seen as holding that, in light of economic literature suggesting
that competitors tend to align their conduct without any agreement,
the existence of parallel conduct suggests just that—conscious
parallelism, not conspiracy.162
Granting this interpretation, it remains unclear what makes
“plausible” an allegation of discrimination in an adverse employment action. Indeed, this takes us back to the Second Circuit’s view
in Swierkiewicz. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green established a
three-step analytical structure for cases that later became known as
“single motive” or “circumstantial” evidence cases.163 The first step
requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, that is, to put on enough evidence to create a presumption
that the employer discriminated.164 Once the prima facie case is
161. One of my colleagues, Professor Denis McLaughlin, argues that plausibility is an allor-nothing standard. A claim is either plausible or it is not, which means that describing a
claim as “more plausible” is inaccurate. The argument is pitched largely on the Court’s
speaking in terms of the “line between possibility and plausibility.” See supra text
accompanying note 105. Although the logic is hard to resist, it is hard to view a concept that
is essentially one of likelihood as not reflecting a continuum. As one moves toward the
“plausibility” finish line in terms of making a claim more likely, the vector seems best
described as “more plausible”—even if it is not necessarily plausible enough to survive a
motion to dismiss on the pleadings.
Of course, it would help if the Court had provided a definition, or at least a better notion,
of plausibility. The concept is so ill-defined that it is not even clear whether there can be only
one plausible interpretation of a set of facts, or whether two or more explanations may all be
plausible. See Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 411 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (“In statistics the range of probabilities is from 0 to 1, and therefore encompasses
‘sheer possibility’ along with ‘plausibility.’ It seems (no stronger word is possible) that what
the Court was driving at was that even if the district judge doesn’t think a plaintiff’s case is
more likely than not to be a winner (that is, doesn’t think p > .5), as long as it is substantially
justified that’s enough.”); Wasserman, supra note 115, at 177 (“Twombly and Iqbal together
suggest that courts may look not for a conclusion of liability that is plausible, but for whether
that conclusion is the more (or most) plausible one.”).
162. See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Pleading Problem in Antitrust Cases and Beyond, 95
IOWA L. REV. BULL. 55, 60 (2010).
163. 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
164. Id. at 802. The Court repeated this theme in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks:
At the close of the defendant’s case, the court is asked to decide whether an issue
of fact remains for the trier of fact to determine. None does if, on the evidence
presented, (1) any rational person would have to find the existence of facts
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established, the employer, at the second step, has a burden of
production to put into evidence a nondiscriminatory reason for the
alleged discriminatory decision.165 Finally, the plaintiff has the
opportunity in the third step to prove that the supposed reason was
really a pretext for an underlying discriminatory motive.166
McDonnell Douglas framed the elements of one flavor of a prima
facie case—in which a job applicant is turned down but no one is
hired in his place167—but it explicitly stated that other situations
would require different formulations,168 a qualification that has generated confusion in the lower courts about the requirements of the
prima facie case in other, more common settings.169 Nevertheless,
constituting a prima facie case, and (2) the defendant has failed to meet its
burden of production-i.e., has failed to introduce evidence which, taken as true,
would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse action. In that event, the court must award judgment to the plaintiff as
a matter of law.
509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993); see also Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254
(1981) (“Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the
employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the trier of fact believes the
plaintiff’s evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must
enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case.”). Thus,
McDonnell Douglas established that certain proof is sufficient for a judgment for plaintiff,
whether or not the proof would require or even permit a finding of the underlying fact—that
the defendant intended to discriminate.
165. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
166. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 (“The defendant’s ‘production’ (whatever its persuasive effect)
having been made, the trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate question: whether plaintiff
has proved ‘that the defendant intentionally discriminated against [him]’ because of his race.
The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief
is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima
facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); see infra text accompanying notes 16771.
167. The plaintiff must establish the following elements:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for
a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant’s qualifications.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. These four prongs of the prima facie case were tailored
to the relatively unusual facts before the Court, namely an employer’s refusal to rehire a
qualified black former employee when the job in question remained vacant.
168. Id. at 802 n.13 (“The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification
above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every
respect to differing factual situations.”).
169. See generally SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 31, § 2.09; Parisis G. Filippatos & Sean
Farhang, The Rights of Employees Subjected to Reductions in Force: A Critical Evaluation, 6
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the purpose of the prima facie case is clear: it requires merely a
showing that a minority or woman has been denied an employment
opportunity in circumstances in which the most obvious innocent
explanations, such as the plaintiff ’s lack of qualifications or the
absence of an opening, are inapplicable.170 As the Court explained
in a later case, “[a] prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises
an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts,
if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the
consideration of impermissible factors.”171
In retrospect, the Second Circuit’s rejected view in Swierkiewicz
seems to have foreshadowed the Twombly/Iqbal path: the Second
Circuit merely required the plaintiff to plead sufficient facts to make
the discriminatory motive claimed for the adverse employment
action plausible by negating the most common nondiscriminatory
explanations, thereby rending the claim of discrimination more
plausible.172 Of course, this is more than notice pleading as traditionally conceived, but it seems to fit well into a plausible pleading
regime. And, although Swierkiewicz faulted the Second Circuit for
confusing a proof structure with pleading requirements and
stressed that discrimination plaintiffs could prevail by different
proof structures than McDonnell Douglas,173 this possibility could
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 263 (2002) (classifying court decisions treating reductions in force).
Another arena in which this debate plays out is whether a plaintiff has to identify a white
“comparator” or comparators who were treated better than the plaintiff to make out a prima
facie case. See infra Part IV.C.
170. The prima facie case eliminates the “most common legitimate reasons on which an
employer might rely” for the adverse employment action. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977). In McDonnell Douglas, these were “an absolute or
relative lack of qualifications [and] the absence of a vacancy in the job sought. Elimination of
these reasons ... is sufficient, absent other explanation, to create an inference that the
decision was a discriminatory one.” Id.
171. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). The Court has not retreated
from this view, although it is important more as a heuristic than as a litigation principle.
Once the defendant has put in evidence of its nondiscriminatory reason, the “presumption”
disappears. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507. Although the fact-finder may still decide for the plaintiff,
it would do so because of inferences drawn from the evidence supporting the prima facie case
and the implausibility of the defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason, not because of any
“presumption” that arises from that prima facie case.
172. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 509 (2002).
173. Id. at 511-12 (“In addition, under a notice pleading system, it is not appropriate to
require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie case because the McDonnell
Douglas framework does not apply in every employment discrimination case. For instance,
if a plaintiff is able to produce direct evidence of discrimination, he may prevail without
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be accommodated under Twombly/Iqbal by recognizing that a
plaintiff can satisfy Rule 8 by plausibly pleading the elements of a
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case or by pleading the components
of other methods of proof, such as employer admissions, so-called
“direct evidence” of discriminatory intent.174
It is true that Swierkiewicz critiqued the Second Circuit’s
“heightened pleading standard” precisely because, under that view,
a plaintiff without direct evidence of discrimination at the time
of his complaint must plead a prima facie case of discrimination,
even though discovery might uncover such direct evidence. It
thus seems incongruous to require a plaintiff, in order to survive
a motion to dismiss, to plead more facts than he may ultimately
need to prove to succeed on the merits if direct evidence of
discrimination is discovered.175

This argument is powerful—but goes to the heart of the difference
between notice pleading and plausible pleading. If a plaintiff must
plead a plausible case in order to be entitled to discovery, which
seems to be the main thrust of Twombly/Iqbal, then Swierkiewicz
has it entirely backward.
IV. SATISFYING PLAUSIBLE PLEADING
From a plaintiff ’s perspective, the most obvious solution to the
problem posed by Twombly/Iqbal is for the Court to reaffirm the
broader views of Swierkiewicz and to do so by clarifying that the
only requirement of a claim is notice to the defendant that a
particular challenged employment decision is both “adverse” and
motivated by an identified discrimination such as race, sex, or age.
But this Article assumes arguendo that Swierkiewicz is no longer
good law. Further, even if an optimistic view of Swierkiewicz’s
viability ultimately prevails, lower courts will struggle with the
question of its status for the foreseeable future. That means that
plaintiffs would be well advised to plead more than Swierkiewicz

proving all the elements of a prima facie case.”).
174. See infra Part IV.B.
175. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511-12.
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requires.176 There are four basic ways in which this can be done:
first, pleading a traditional prima facie case; second, pleading
“direct evidence” of discrimination; third, pleading other bases for
inferring discriminatory intent, such as the existence of comparators;177 and, fourth, pleading “legislative facts” that make the inference of discrimination that might be drawn from the adjudicative
facts more plausible.178
A. Pleading a McDonnell Douglas Prima Facie Case
Swierkiewicz rejected any requirement of pleading a McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case,179 but it never suggested that such a
pleading would not suffice. Although McDonnell Douglas has been
largely discredited by scholars who generally view the decision as
both intellectually bankrupt and superseded by Desert Palace,180 it
176. They should also take advantage of the logic of Twombly and Iqbal. For example,
courts have often under notice pleading sliced and diced plaintiffs’ claims in order to separate
out time-barred from timely violations. E.g., Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen, Inc., 496 F.3d
229, 245 (2d Cir. 2007). Although that remains a legitimate task for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
courts should not disregard allegations of time-barred violations in determining whether
timely claims are “plausible.” Just as the statute does not bar an employee “from using the
prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim,” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002), allegations of time-barred conduct, taken as true, may
support the plausibility of the pleading of timely claims.
177. The second and third methods could well be considered subsets of the first, given the
varying uses of “prima facie case” in employment discrimination law. See infra notes 187-89.
For purposes of exposition, however, they are treated here as separate approaches.
178. Another possibility is to bring suit for violation of the federal antidiscrimination laws
in state court, which has concurrent jurisdiction. E.g., Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly,
494 U.S. 820 (1990). Although a number of states have adopted notice pleading analogs to
Rule 8, they are split as to whether to interpret their pleading regimes to satisfy Twombly and
Iqbal or continue the more permissive approach under Conley. Compare Iannacchino v. Ford
Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879, 890 (Mass. 2008) (adopting plausible pleading), with Cullen v.
Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 P.3d 344, 345 (Ariz. 2008) (reaffirming Conley).
179. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515.
180. See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title
VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 102-03 (2004); William R. Corbett, An
Allegory of the Cave and the Desert Palace, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1549, 1576-77 (2005); William
R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 199, 212-13 (2003); Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse
Standard and Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 861 (2004).
But see Steven J. Kaminshine, Disparate Treatment as a Theory of Discrimination: The Need
for a Restatement, Not a Revolution, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 38-62 (2005); Michael J. Zimmer,
The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53
EMORY L.J. 1887, 1922-23 (2004).
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remains alive and well in the courts.181 Indeed, it is the more recent,
and arguably more sensible, Desert Palace decision that is rarely
cited182 and, when it is, usually on the way to applying McDonnell
Douglas.183 In short, the lower courts are familiar with McDonnell
Douglas, and any plaintiff who can plead such a prima facie case,
within the limits of Rule 11,184 would be well advised to do so since
such a pleading should make the claim plausible.185
This is not as simple a solution as might be thought because of
the divergence in the circuits as to what constitutes a prima facie
case. McDonnell Douglas itself dealt with a very unusual situation
—failure to hire when the position remained open.186 Most discrimination cases involve discharges, and even when failure to hire is
alleged, the position has typically been filled by a competitor. The
circuits have developed a variety of versions of the prima facie
case for a variety of situations.187 Although some of the formulations
are so generalized that satisfying them necessarily satisfies the
notion of plausible pleading,188 others are particularized, to, say,
181. The case was cited 2262 times by the federal courts during 2010. LexisNexis search
conducted Jan. 27, 2011. In addition, the Supreme Court’s refusal in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 n.2 (2009), to decide “whether the evidentiary framework of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green utilized in Title VII cases is appropriate in the ADEA
context” strongly reinforces the notion that McDonnell Douglas is alive and well.
182. The case was cited only 168 times in 2010. LexisNexis search conducted Jan. 27, 2011.
183. E.g., Lewis v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transp. Auth., 343 F. App’x 450, 455 (11th Cir.
2009).
184. Rule 11 operates as a significant limitation on pleading to satisfy Twombly/Iqbal.
There seems little doubt that plaintiffs in both cases could have pled sufficient facts to state
a claim, but such pleading is constrained by the requirement of Rule 11, especially 11(b)(3)
requiring an attorney to ensure that “the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity
for further investigation or discovery.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). Professor Hartnett suggests
that the “likely [to] have evidentiary support” prong can provide a way around the broader
potential implications of plausible pleading. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, supra note 22, at
505.
185. We have seen that the purpose of the prima facie case is to eliminate the “most
common legitimate reasons” for an adverse employment action. See supra note 170. If the
plaintiff ’s pleadings, assumed to be true, do eliminate the most common legitimate reasons,
the alternative discrimination inference necessarily becomes more plausible and, presumably,
plausible enough to state a claim. But see supra note 168.
186. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
187. See generally SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 31, §§ 2.07, 2.09.
188. This kind of tautological formulation is typified by Mario v. P & C Food Markets, Inc.,
313 F.3d 758, 767 (2d Cir. 2002):
Ordinarily, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination
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termination decision.189 Nevertheless, tracking circuit precedent
seems the simplest and most obvious response to Twombly/Iqbal.
It is true that an argument could be made that, under plausible
pleading, even a prima facie case does not necessarily mean that
discrimination is plausible, and an occasional court has so held.190
Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff at the prima facie stage
need not negate all the possible, or perhaps even all the probable,
legitimate reasons for the employer’s action. For example, an applicant denied a job when a competitor is hired need only prove that
she met the minimum qualifications to establish a prima facie
case.191 She need not prove that she was as or more qualified than
the successful applicant. This is because the primary role of
McDonnell Douglas has been to trigger the employer’s burden of
putting into evidence a “legitimate nondiscriminatory reason,”192
rather than to establish discrimination per se. Indeed, the bareby showing that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he is competent to
perform the job or is performing his duties satisfactorily; (3) he suffered an
adverse employment decision or action; and (4) the decision or action occurred
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination based on his
membership in the protected class.
I have previously critiqued this formulation:
The best that can be said for this “inference-from-circumstances” test is that it
provides literally no guidance; the worst that can be said for it is that it is
internally inconsistent. After all, if plaintiff can adduce evidence of circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, as the fourth prong
requires, it is not so clear what work the other three elements do.
Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60
ALA. L. REV. 191, 205 (2009) [hereinafter Sullivan, Comparators] (footnote omitted). As
applied to the pleading context, however, it should be clear that both this version of the prima
facie case and the requirements of Iqbal would be met by allegations that allowed the court
to infer discrimination.
189. E.g., Freeman v. N. State Bank, 282 F. App’x 211, 216 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[Plaintiff] was
obligated to prove that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action, (3) she was performing satisfactorily at the time of the adverse
employment action, and (4) similarly situated employees outside the protected class received
more favorable treatment.”). With respect to this and other formulations of the prima facie
case, see SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 31, § 2.09.
190. E.g., Urbanski v. Tech Data, No. 3:07cv017, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2528 (N.D. Ind.
Jan. 11, 2008).
191. Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA.
L. REV. 741, 768 (2005) (“[T]o make out a prima facie case, an employee must show that she
met the objective or minimum qualifications for the position in question. She is not required
to show that she met her employer’s subjective standards. It is the employer’s burden to raise
these subjective standards in response to the plaintiff ’s prima facie case.”).
192. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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bones requirements of the prima facie case may explain the Court’s
limited requirements for the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas
analytical structure: once a plaintiff has made out a prima facie
case, the defendant has only a burden of production to present
evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason.193 This production requirement does not shift from the plaintiff the burden of persuasion as
to the existence of discrimination, but, rather, merely asks the
defendant to put into evidence a reason that, if believed, would establish nondiscrimination.194 The bulk of the work of the McDonnell
Douglas proof structure, therefore, falls on the third, pretext stage,
in which the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion in proving that
the employer’s asserted nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual.195
Further, a plaintiff cannot carry this burden merely by showing that
the defendant’s asserted nondiscriminatory reason is untrue; rather,
a plaintiff must also persuade the fact-finder that that reason is a
pretext for discrimination.196 Fortunately for plaintiffs, the factfinder’s finding of pretext—that is, its disbelief of the supposed
nondiscriminatory reason—will often, maybe typically, be sufficient
to justify the further inference that it is a pretext for discrimination.197
Whatever the merits of this scheme as a proof structure, it is a
procedural approach adopted for substantive reasons, not a simple
factual inference. That is to say, it is an information-forcing device,
which does not clearly map onto the Twombly/Iqbal plausible
pleading regime. For example, given that typically many applicants
are rejected for every successful candidate, it may be far more likely
that a particular rejection was the result of the plaintiff having
inferior qualifications to the person chosen rather than discrimina193. Id.
194. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (“The plaintiff retains
the burden of persuasion. She now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the
proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. This burden now
merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of
intentional discrimination.”).
195. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
196. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (“[A] reason cannot be proved
to be ‘a pretext for discrimination’ unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that
discrimination was the real reason.”).
197. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (“Proof that the
defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence
that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive.”).

1654

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1613

tion—even though McDonnell Douglas would find a prima facie case
if the plaintiff established she met the minimum qualifications for
the position.
Nevertheless, it would take a determined district court judge not
only to find Swierkiewicz no longer binding but also to find that a
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case was insufficient to satisfy the
plausibility standard, because McDonnell Douglas is so well-recognized by circuit court precedent to create a presumption of discrimination.
B. Pleading “Direct Evidence” of Discrimination
Borrowing from Swierkiewicz’s reference to other methods of proof
under Title VII, a second approach would be for the plaintiff to
plead whatever “direct evidence” she had that discriminatory intent
motivated the challenged decision. In Swierkiewicz itself,198 the
Court rejected the Second Circuit’s requirement of pleading a
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case in part because “a plaintiff
without direct evidence of discrimination at the time of his complaint [would have to] plead a prima facie case of discrimination,
even though discovery might uncover such direct evidence.”199 The
Court’s citation to “direct evidence” was to a decision invalidating a
formal employer policy of discrimination,200 and, although the situation will arise rarely, it seems likely that plaintiffs will know of
such policies at the time they file the complaint and can therefore
plead them.
But there is another use of “direct evidence” in Title VII jurisprudence that has a checkered history but seems to offer another way
to plausibly plead. In the discrimination context, the term became
famous because of Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a “mixed motive” case—that is, one in which
the fact-finder had determined that both legitimate and discrimina198. The question presented in Swierkiewicz was whether an employment discrimination
plaintiff must “plead specific facts showing that at trial he can make out a prima facie case
of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas.” Brief of Petitioner at i, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (No. 00-1853).
199. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511.
200. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985) (holding illegal a policy
barring transfer of pilots disqualified by age under FAA regulations to other positions while
allowing pilots disqualified for other reasons to transfer).
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tory reasons were at play in the decision.201 Justice Brennan,
writing for a plurality of four, held that the plaintiff need only
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that her gender played
“a motivating part” in the challenged decision.202 Upon that
showing, the burden of persuasion shifted to the defendant to avoid
liability by proving as an affirmative defense that it would have
made the same decision even had it not considered an impermissible
factor.203
To form a majority of the Court, however, one of the concurrences
was necessary,204 and one alternative was to look to Justice
O’Connor’s concurring opinion, whose approach differed from the
plurality’s with regard to burden shifting.205 Most saliently, she
would have required a plaintiff to introduce “direct” evidence of discrimination before the defendant had any burden of persuasion.206
Although it would have been possible to seek a fifth vote in Justice
White’s concurrence in Price Waterhouse,207 most lower courts looked
201. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion). The plaintiff introduced into evidence written
evaluations and oral comments made in an accounting firm’s partnership process that
suggested that the plaintiff ’s gender played a role in the decision to put her candidacy on
hold. Id. at 233-35. The firm, however, denied basing its decision on the plaintiff ’s sex, instead
insisting she had been denied partnership because of her lack of interpersonal skills. Id. at
234-35. The trial court credited both Hopkins’s and the firm’s explanation for her partnership
denial; it found that the firm had relied on both Hopkins’s sex and her deficient interpersonal
skills in denying her partnership. Id. at 236-37.
202. Id. at 258.
203. Id.
204. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (holding that, when there is no
opinion for a majority of the Court, the holding is to be ascertained by looking to the
narrowest ground upon which five members who support the judgment agree).
205. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 275 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
206. Id. at 278. Justice O’Connor would also have required the plaintiff to show that the
impermissible factor, such as a plaintiff ’s sex, was a “substantial” (rather than merely a
“motivating”) factor in the employer’s decision. Id. at 261-62.
207. Id. at 258 (White, J., concurring). Dissenting in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009), Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter, took
precisely this position:
Justice White agreed with the plurality as to the motivating-factor test; he
disagreed only as to the type of evidence an employer was required to submit to
prove that the same result would have occurred absent the unlawful motivation.
Taking the plurality to demand objective evidence, he wrote separately to
express his view that an employer’s credible testimony could suffice. Because
Justice White provided a fifth vote for the “rationale explaining the result” of the
Price Waterhouse decision, his concurrence is properly understood as controlling,
and he, like the plurality, did not require the introduction of direct evidence.
Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2357 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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to Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion to fashion the rule of the
case.
Thus, for a number of years, courts applied a second, “direct
evidence” method of proof to some Title VII cases, and they did so
even after the Civil Rights Act of 1991 modified Title VII by
adopting Justice Brennan’s articulation of the plaintiff ’s “motivating
factor” burden without mentioning direct evidence.208 Section 703(m)
provides that “an unlawful employment practice is established when
the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”209
Congress, generally following Price Waterhouse, also allowed a
defense, but unlike the Supreme Court made the defense a partial
one: if the employer proved that it would have made the same
decision even if an illegitimate consideration had not been a factor,
the plaintiff ’s remedies would be limited.210 Although the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 did not explicitly speak to a “direct evidence”
threshold for applying this method of analysis under Price Waterhouse, lower courts for some years generally continued to require
such proof to trigger burden shifting.211
This practice, however, ended for Title VII cases with the
Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa.212
That decision intepreted the “motivating factor” language in
§ 2000e-2(m) to mean that “[i]n order to obtain an instruction under
§ 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for any employment practice.’”213 In short, “direct evidence”

208. See, e.g., Watson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2000); Robert
Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: A Brief Updated
View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV. 651, 657-58 (2000).
209. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 703(m), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
210. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Price Waterhouse had held that proof that the same decision
would have been made in any event was a complete defense to liability. 490 U.S. at 254.
211. See, e.g., Watson, 207 F.3d at 217; Belton, supra note 208, at 657-58. Courts held this
requirement despite the incoherence of the notion. See Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for
Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107,
1137-38, 1157-61 (1991).
212. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
213. Id. at 101.
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was no longer necessary to shift a burden of persuasion under Title
VII.214
In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the Court took a
different path but reached the same result in making direct
evidence unnecessary—under the ADEA.215 Although Desert Palace
had ended any such requirement under Title VII, it remained
unclear whether the concept continued to exist under the ADEA,
and lower courts continued to apply it there.216 Gross, however, held
that neither the 1991 Civil Rights Act nor Price Waterhouse
controlled ADEA cases.217 Instead, the Court held that it is always
the plaintiff ’s burden to prove that discriminatory intent was a
determinative factor, that is, a but-for cause, of the challenged
employment practice.218 All evidence is relevant to making that
decision, and even high quality evidence does not relieve the
plaintiff of her causation burden.
In sum, although “direct evidence” is no longer necessary for
burden shifting under Title VII, nor sufficient for burden shifting
under the ADEA, it remains true that the more “direct” the evidence, the more likely a case will get to the jury and be decided in
the plaintiff ’s favor.
As applied to the pleading context, this preference for direct
evidence suggests that plaintiffs may satisfy plausible pleading by
alleging this kind of evidence of discriminatory intent. To this point,
“direct evidence” has been put in scare quotes because the concept
is at best undefined by the Supreme Court and at worst incoherent.
The closest Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Price Waterhouse
came to defining the term was her statement that “the plaintiff
must produce evidence sufficient to show that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the particular employment
decision such that a reasonable fact-finder could draw an inference
214. Justice O’Connor concurred that direct evidence was no longer required, reasoning
that the 1991 amendments had legislatively reversed her approach. Id. at 102 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
215. 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). See generally Michael C. Harper, The Causation Standard in
Federal Employment Law: Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., and the Unfulfilled Promise
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 69 (2010); Melissa Hart, Procedural
Extremism: The Supreme Court’s 2008-09 Labor and Employment Cases, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 253 (2009); Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 857 (2010).
216. E.g., Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 339-40 (4th Cir. 2004).
217. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349, 2351.
218. Id. at 2352.
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that the decision was made ‘because of’ the plaintiff ’s protected
status.”219 This statement is broader than the classical view of direct
evidence: evidence is direct when no inference need be drawn to find
the fact at issue.220 Indeed, Justice O’Connor’s statement does not
distinguish the evidence she apparently had in mind from circumstantial evidence sufficient for the fact-finder to draw an inference
that the defendant acted with an intent to discriminate. Justice
O’Connor, however, did indicate some types of evidence that would
not be sufficiently direct to justify the use of this method of proof:
[S]tray remarks in the workplace ... cannot justify requiring the
employer to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were
based on legitimate criteria. Nor can statements by
nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated
to the decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiff’s
burden.... [T]estimony such as Dr. Fiske’s [that statements of
some partners exhibited stereotypical thinking about the
plaintiff], standing alone, would not justify shifting the burden
of persuasion to the employer.221

Taking their lead from this “definition,” most lower courts had
defined the term “direct evidence” narrowly.222 Some decisions,
looking to the nineteenth-century view, held that direct evidence is
evidence that proves the fact at issue without the need to draw an
inference. For these courts, the only direct evidence would be
statements by the decision maker directed at the decision being
challenged and relatively contemporaneous with it. For example, in
Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, a witness testified
that the manager who denied the plaintiff ’s promotion had said that
she “identified [in herself] a bias against blacks and she found that
219. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 278, 228 (1989).
220. “Direct” had been rejected as a useful categorization of evidence in the nineteenth century. See Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 311 (1850). Although Wigmore
originally thought a real difference did exist between direct and circumstantial evidence, the
current edition concludes that he was wrong. 1A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 24, at 945 n.5 (Peter Tillers ed., 1983) (“[T]here is no such thing as ‘direct
apprehension’ of any matter that may in some way directly and conclusively resolve any
question as to the existence or nonexistence of some matter of fact and we therefore believe
that Wigmore erred.”).
221. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277.
222. See Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, 199 F.3d 572, 582-83 (1st Cir. 1999)
(canvassing the circuits for different schools of thought on the definition of direct evidence).

2011]

PLAUSIBLY PLEADING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

1659

they were difficult for her to trust or get along with.”223 This
statement was found not to be direct evidence because an inference
was needed to conclude that the challenged action was taken for
discriminatory reasons:
First, the statement ... is susceptible to more than one interpretation. Cook, in explaining her bias to a black colleague, could
have been expressing a desire to get past [prior] prejudices....
Second, the statement does not relate directly to the decision to
promote Carter to the position of Program Director. To say that
Cook “identified a bias” to Allen is not the same as saying that
Cook exercised that bias in the case of Carter’s promotion. Direct
evidence, by definition, is evidence that does not require such an
inferential leap between fact and conclusion.224

While other courts took a more permissive approach to what sufficed
as burden-shifting direct evidence, the term has now fallen out of
use due to the developments sketched above.225
Nevertheless, this history is suggestive for our purposes: the kind
of evidence at issue in these cases should, if pleaded, satisfy the
Twombly/Iqbal standard. Perhaps more important in light of the restrictive approaches of the lower courts under the Price Waterhouse
dispensation, evidence could be considerably less direct than many
courts required and still satisfy the pleading standard. Because the
issue is only plausibility, not whether there is any shift in the
burden of proof, the pleadings need not reflect the kind of statements that constituted direct evidence for Justice O’Connor. Even
what would have been characterized as “stray remarks” might well
suffice. In Carter, for example, allegations that the decision maker
223. 132 F.3d 635, 642 (11th Cir. 1998).
224. Id.; see also Lim v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 297 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2002); Harris v.
Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 99 F.3d 1078, 1080 (11th Cir. 1996); Brown v. E. Miss. Elec.
Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993).
225. E.g., Ostrowski v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 1992) (defining direct
evidence to include some circumstantial evidence as long as that evidence is tied directly to
the alleged discrimination against the plaintiff); see also Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union
Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 115, 124 n.12 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding that the plaintiff ’s
supervisors’ statements that it was “not possible for [her] to be a good mother and have this
job,” were not mere “stray remarks”; they were direct evidence since the alleged statements
“were (1) made repeatedly, (2) drew a direct link between gender stereotypes and the
conclusion that Back should not be tenured, and (3) were made by supervisors who played a
substantial role in the decision to terminate”).
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admitted a bias should get a complaint past a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), whether or not the Eleventh Circuit was correct
that such remarks were insufficient to take the case to the jury.226
C. Pleading Comparators
Some recent scholarship seeks to move away from the McDonnell
Douglas structure to a more general theory of unequal treatment as
a basis of proving discrimination.227 As part of this effort, I argued
in a recent article in favor of an alternative to the McDonnell
Douglas proof scheme for many, if not most, individual disparate
treatment cases that would require the plaintiff only to identify a
“comparator,” another similarly situated worker who was treated
better than the plaintiff was treated.228 By definition, the more alike
a putative comparator is to the plaintiff, except for a protected
characteristic like race, the fewer nonracial reasons exist to explain
a particular decision. Of course, the point at which a coworker is
226. One kind of case in which a kind of direct evidence is often easily pled involves
harassment. Indeed, it seems likely that, if the plaintiff is unaware of objectionable conduct,
it cannot constitute harassment because her environment cannot be affected by it, see
SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 31, § 7.07[C], although how the employer treats harassment
that does not affect the plaintiff might be relevant to an employer’s affirmative defense. Id.
§ 7.07[F]. Some of the critics of Twombly/Iqbal have critiqued the lower courts’ application
of plausible pleading precisely because they have dismissed harassment cases. See Schneider,
supra note 34, at 534-35 (citing Rivera v. Prince William County Sch. Bd., No.
1:09cv341(GBL), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63647 (E.D. Va. July 22, 2009)); Seiner, The Trouble
with Twombly, supra note 34, at 1036 (citing Mangum v. Town of Holly Springs, 551 F. Supp.
2d 439 (E.D.N.C. 2008)). But such criticism may be misplaced. Actionable contaminatedenvironment harassment requires “severe or pervasive” conduct, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,
510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986), and a
plaintiff should be able to plead sufficient incidents to satisfy this standard if they in fact
occurred. Although admittedly such pleading goes beyond what notice pleading has
traditionally required, see Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly, supra note 34, at 1051 n.262
(“A plaintiff should not be required to plead the specific acts that comprise the hostile work
environment, as this would go well beyond the scope of notice pleading.”), the problem with
cases like Rivera and Mangum may be less plausible pleading running amok than the court’s
too high standard of what makes conduct severe or pervasive.
Similarly, retaliation cases turn, in the first instance, on whether the plaintiff engaged in
protected conduct, by opposing action reasonably believed to be unlawful employment
practices. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 129 S. Ct. 846, 85052 (2009). A plaintiff should be able to plead what she did in sufficient factual detail to enable
the court to determine whether the opposition was plausibly protected.
227. See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences Proving Discrimination, 79 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1243, 1266-75 (2008).
228. See generally Sullivan, Comparators, supra note 188.
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different enough from a plaintiff to cease to be a comparator will
vary depending on perceptions of the relative likelihood of discrimination compared to other reasons for adverse actions:229
The reality on the ground is that discrimination cases today
increasingly turn not on whether the plaintiff has proven her
prima facie case or established that the “legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” is a pretext for discrimination (although the
courts continue to invoke the McDonnell Douglas mantra), but
rather on whether the plaintiff has identified a suitable “comparator” who was treated more favorably than she. If the
comparator is sufficiently similar, that evidence alone is
sufficient to permit—but not require—a jury to infer discrimination from the different treatment. Even a somewhat less perfect
comparator may, together with other evidence, allow for such an
inference.230

Although that article was directed at proof, not pleading, it also has
useful implications for satisfying plausible pleading. Indeed,
Professor Hartnett notes that Swierkiewicz can itself be read as a
comparator case: rather than seeing the Court as accepting as true
the allegation of discriminatory motive, Swierkiewicz can be interpreted as accepting the plaintiff ’s pleading that there existed a
similarly situated comparator of a different national origin and
younger age who was treated more favorably than the plaintiff.231
Typically in the summary judgment context, the circuits tend to
require comparators to be the near twin of the plaintiff in order, on
the basis of the comparison alone, to allow the case to go to the
jury.232 Although I argued for a more relaxed approach to comparators, the ultimate appropriateness of the comparison is largely
attenuated in the pleading context.233 That is, plaintiffs who identify
a person who they allege to be a similarly situated but better
229. Id. (arguing for a more direct method of comparator proof); see also Ernest F. Lidge
III, The Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in Employment Discrimination Law,
67 MO. L. REV. 831 (2002) (arguing that courts should not impose a strict similarly situated
requirement).
230. Sullivan, Comparators, supra note 188, at 193.
231. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Further, although not referred to by the
Court, paragraph 38 of the Swierkiewicz complaint also adduced four other comparators who
had been treated better than the plaintiff with regard to severance pay.
232. Sullivan, Comparators, supra note 188, at 213-23.
233. Id. at 229-38.
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treated member of a different race or sex should thereby typically
“nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”234 As with all pleading, Rule 11 limits whom the plaintiff can
so identify, but questions as to whether the particular comparator
is sufficiently similarly situated or whether other potential comparators exist who undercut the inference of discrimination have far
less relevance at the pleading stage.235
D. Pleading the Pervasiveness of Bias
A fourth approach to satisfying the more extreme possible implications of Twombly/Iqbal is itself more extreme but seems to be
allowed, indeed invited, by the Court’s requirement that a plaintiff
plead sufficient facts to make her claim plausible. Put at its
simplest, it amounts to pleading that the phenomenon of discrimination is more common than the courts might otherwise believe.236
As Professor Suzanna Sherry argues, “those who wish to stem the
tide of increased pleading standards must attack its underlying
factual assumptions,”237 and this is one way to do that in the employment discrimination context.
The question, of course, is how that attack can be launched. A
traditional method would be to cite social science research in briefs
opposing a motion to dismiss. Less traditional would be to adduce
at that stage expert reports as to the pervasiveness of discrimination.238 Although both have their advantages, I propose a third
234. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
235. Of course, a plaintiff might have to specify the basis for treating a favored person as
a comparator. See Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, No. 09-1582, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS
23291 (4th Cir. Nov. 10, 2010) (dismissing a complaint for failure to identify in what way the
supposed comparator was similarly situated). For example, a complaint of wage
discrimination between two individuals far apart in the defendant’s hierarchy might not
suffice, but courts should be reluctant to find implausible a claim that identifies comparators
and indicates the axes of comparison.
236. Other scholars have looked to evidence of the pervasiveness of discrimination as a
reason to find pleadings plausible, see, e.g., Malveaux, supra note 115, at 97-102; Seiner, After
Iqbal, supra note 22, at 200-03, but they have not argued that the kind of studies they report
should be pled and, accordingly, given a presumption of truth.
237. Sherry, supra note 31, at 184.
238. This approach might require that a motion to dismiss be converted into a summary
judgment motion, which, in turn, might result in the court’s granting the plaintiff an
opportunity to continue discovery. This approach is explored by Stephen R. Brown in
Correlation Plausibility: A Framework for Fairness and Predicability in Pleading Practice
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way—simply pleading this social science as a fact, thereby requiring
the court to take that fact as true. As we will see, this approach has
considerable merit, but some serious objections. But before we consider the propriety of such pleading, it is important to understand
the nature of the enterprise.
Twombly itself provides a starting point. The opinion turned not
on the Justices’ everyday life assumptions as to plausibility, but
rather on the economic research that showed that parallel conduct
is as consistent with independent competitor responses to the competitive environment as it is with conspiracy.239 Suppose, however,
that the plaintiffs had been able to plead that economic studies
showed that the kind of coordination they alleged is very unlikely
absent an agreement. Taking the Court at its word, perhaps such
studies should have sufficed to make the claim plausible.
Indeed, without probing too deeply into the arcana of antitrust,
the Court’s current perception that parallel conduct can occur
without an agreement240 is itself the result of changing perceptions
in the economic literature. Although that view is dominant today,241
it was not always the accepted wisdom either in the law and
economics literature242 or the courts.243 If further economic and game
After Twombly and Iqbal, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 141 (2011). For Brown, the answer will turn
on whether the information adduced constitutes “matters outside the pleadings” within the
meaning of Rule 12(d). The argument in this Article, of course, is that the requisite
information should be pleaded and, therefore, be within the pleadings. Only if such allegations
were not accorded the presumption of truth would it be necessary to reach the Rule 12(d)
issue.
239. The Court also relied on the history of the telecommunications industry. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 567-68 (“In a traditionally unregulated industry with low barriers to entry, sparse
competition among large firms dominating separate geographical segments of the market
could very well signify illegal agreement, but here we have an obvious alternative
explanation. In the decade preceding the 1996 Act and well before that, monopoly was the
norm in telecommunications, not the exception. The ILECs were born in that world, doubtless
liked the world the way it was, and surely knew the adage about him who lives by the sword.
Hence, a natural explanation for the noncompetition alleged is that the former Governmentsanctioned monopolists were sitting tight, expecting their neighbors to do the same thing.”)
(internal citation omitted).
240. See id. at 554 (“The inadequacy of showing parallel conduct or interdependence,
without more, mirrors the ambiguity of the behavior: consistent with conspiracy, but just as
much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally
prompted by common perceptions of the market.”).
241. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Motions To Dismiss Antitrust Cases: Separating Fact
from Fantasy 3-4 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Related Publ’n 06-08,
2006) (discussing problem of “false positives” in section 1 suits).
242. See generally Gregory J. Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion:
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theory research were to challenge that predicate, and if such
findings were pleaded,244 the logic of Twombly would require a
different result: what was implausible in light of the state of
economic knowledge in Year 1 would become plausible in Year 2
when economic findings altered, or vice versa.245
To understand how this might operate under Title VII, it is
important to appreciate that the core question for disparate treatment law is how likely discrimination is to motivate a given decision
at this stage in the nation’s history in light of a host of other
potential motivations—whether they be rational or irrational. As
Professor Hartnett says, “determinations of plausibility depend on
baseline assumptions about the way the world usually works.”246 If
a judge views bias as rarely at play in today’s workplace, it will take
more in the way of allegations for him to find a claim of discrimination plausible.
Nor is this objectionable or, at least, avoidable. Baseline assumptions are critical to the whole adjudicative enterprise, which depends on probabilistic determinations. Occasionally, probabilities
can be assessed by scientific methods. For example, testimony about
the likelihood of DNA matches is common in criminal trials,247 and
Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 719 (2004) (tracing the
origins of modern economic theory to groundbreaking work in the first half of the last century
that altered prior conceptions).
243. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 225-27 (1939) (allowing an
inference of agreement largely as a result of parallel conduct); cf. Theatre Enters., Inc. v.
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954) (“Circumstantial evidence of
consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial
attitude toward conspiracy; but ‘conscious parallelism’ has not yet read conspiracy out of the
Sherman Act entirely.”).
244. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, supra note 22, at 500 (“Twombly can be understood as
inviting lawyers to present information and argument designed to convince a judge that what
the judge thinks is ‘natural’ is not.”).
245. In fact, some environments are not conducive to competitors being able to coordinate
their practices without an agreement facilitated by meetings among the leading members of
the industry. See CHARLES A. BANE, THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CONSPIRACIES: THE TREBLE
DAMAGE ACTIONS 150-58 (1973) (exploring the mechanisms needed to enforce an agreement
in an industry characterized by sealed bids and nonfungible products).
246. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, supra note 22, at 498; see also Bone, Pleading Rules,
supra note 69, at 885-86.
247. The frequency of this testimony does not mean that there are not meaningful disputes
about probabilities even in this setting. See Edward K. Cheng, Law, Statistics, and the
Reference Class Problem, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 92, 93 (2009), http://www.columbia
lawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/109/92_Cheng.pdf (“In DNA cases, prosecutors often
emphasize the random match probability (RMP), the probability that a person chosen at
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in systemic employment discrimination cases, statistical analysis is
often critical.248 But most of the decisions the legal system must
make—whether by judges or juries—are based on seat-of-the-pants
perceptions of probability, which in turn depend on “baseline
assumptions.” How likely is it that this witness is mistaken in her
identification? How likely is it that a texter while driving was also
keeping a careful eye on the road?249
Professor Hartnett argues that plaintiffs may have a heightened
need to shift baseline assumptions in the discrimination arena,
where it is possible that “many judges operate from a baseline
assumption that unlawful discrimination is rare,”250 while lawful
adverse actions can stem from a variety of causes. In other words,
if federal judges view discrimination as not particularly prevalent,
they are likely to view pleadings attacking any given employment
decision as not stating a plausible claim.251 Indeed, the Iqbal Court’s
random from the population will have the same profile as the one found at the crime scene.
Yet, what population is appropriate for calculating the RMP? The entire human population?
The defendant’s racial subgroup? The city in which the crime occurred?”).
248. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-11 (1977)
(identifying the right comparison group from which to determine if African Americans were
sufficiently underrepresented in the defendant’s workforce to suggest the operation of
intentional discrimination). See generally SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 31, § 3.04.
249. See Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note 69, at 885-86 (“By a ‘baseline,’ I mean the normal
state of affairs for situations of the same general type as those described in the complaint. The
probability of wrongdoing for baseline conduct is not necessarily zero, but it should be very
small, for otherwise the conduct in question would not be part of a socially acceptable
baseline. Understood in these terms, what the Twombly Court requires are allegations that
differ in some significant way from what usually occurs in the baseline and differ in a way
that supports a higher probability of wrongdoing than is ordinarily associated with baseline
conduct.”).
250. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, supra note 22, at 502; see also Sherry, supra note 31, at
182-83 (“To the extent that the Court has come to believe ... that invidious discrimination is
no longer the most likely explanation for adverse employment actions ... Swierkiewicz is
clearly in the crosshairs.”) (footnote omitted).
251. A good example of this is Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., where the court, in the
summary judgment context, indicated that even “apparently irrational differences in
treatment” may not give rise to an inference of discrimination:
Sometimes apparently irrational differences in treatment between different
employees that cannot be explained on the basis of clearly articulated company
policies may be explained by the fact that the discipline was administered by
different supervisors, or that the events occurred at different times when the
company’s attitudes toward certain infractions were different, or that the
individualized circumstances surrounding the infractions offered some
mitigation for the infractions less severely punished, or even that the less
severely sanctioned employee may be more valuable to the company for
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reliance on judicial “common sense” to resolve questions of plausibility is particularly threatening for Title VII claims. Professor
Malveaux is decidedly of this view, arguing that judges, especially
in a post-Obama world, tend to be very skeptical of the presence of
discrimination.252 Although this skepticism has in the past manifested itself in restrictive doctrines and frequent grants of summary
judgment to defendants, Twombly/Iqbal opens yet another front
where a baseline assumption about the unlikelihood of discrimination will result in more pro-defendant rulings.
Should a case get to trial, baseline assumptions of the fact-finder
can be shifted in a variety of ways, for example, by expert witnesses.
One dramatic example of this is the use of experts to undercut
“common sense” notions of the reliability of eyewitness identification.253 Similarly, expert reports attempting to shift baseline assumptions can be proffered in discrimination cases in response to a
summary judgment motion. In this context, the aim is to persuade
the court to decide that a reasonable jury, informed by the evidence
in question, could find in favor of the plaintiff. In both these
contexts, the word “plausibility” is not used; rather, the question is
framed in terms of whether a reasonable jury could, or will, be able
to find or infer the fact at issue with the necessary certainty:
preponderance of the evidence in most civil cases.
In the pleading context, the inquiry is narrower, even under
Twombly/Iqbal. The question is not whether a reasonable jury
could find discrimination—even assuming the facts pled are
true—but rather whether the facts pled make the claim plausible
nondiscriminatory reasons than is the other employee. Other times, no rational
explanation for the differential treatment ... may be offered other than the
inevitability that human relationships cannot be structured with mathematical
precision, and even that explanation does not compel the conclusion that the
defendant was acting with a secret, illegal discriminatory motive.
483 F.3d 1106, 1120-21 (10th Cir. 2007). Although the statement is literally true in that even
irrational employment actions do not necessarily reflect discrimination, it manifests a baseline
assumption that discrimination is far less common than a host of other possible explanations,
including irrationality.
252. Malveaux, supra note 115, at 93 (“The problem is not that a judge may be sympathetic
or unsympathetic to discrimination claims, but that his personal perception, rather than the
law, threatens to become outcome determinative.”). Professor Malveaux also argues that
judges do not understand the complex mechanisms that may lead to discrimination in today’s
workplace. Id. at 89-90, 92-94; see also Schneider, supra note 34, at 548.
253. See generally Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered:
Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 960-64 (2006).
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and therefore justify allowing the plaintiff to conduct discovery that
might reveal information that would permit such a finding at trial.
But are the methods of doing so the same? The traditional way
would be to simply use briefs responding to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to cite and explain the social science literature that suggests that
discrimination is common. A more aggressive approach for plaintiffs
would be to adduce expert reports that bear on the plausibility
question. Such reports, for example, could be tendered in response
to a motion to dismiss. This timing would be a dramatically
different approach to expert testimony—testifying experts tend to
produce reports near the end of the discovery period when the
factual information has been uncovered. Expert reports at the outset
of litigation are rare. Indeed, the only major area in which a
variation of the early expert report is used are “affidavit of merit”
statutes, which typically require a plaintiff claiming professional
malpractice to file an affidavit from an expert attesting to the merit
of the claim.254
The affidavit of merit approach requires, for example, “an
affidavit of an appropriate licensed person that there exists a
reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or
exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the
complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or occupational
standards or treatment practices.”255 It thus requires the expert to
opine on the case at hand, not merely on the general standards of
the profession in the abstract. Presumably, the typical medical
malpractice plaintiff has enough information about her condition
and treatment to secure an appropriate expert opinion.
In the discrimination context, however, an expert report aimed at
the plaintiff ’s particular circumstances is likely to be premature
because nothing but the plaintiff ’s version of events has been
254. See generally Jeffrey A. Parness & Amy Leonetti, Expert Opinion Pleading: Any Merit
to Special Certificates of Merit?, 1997 BYU L. REV. 537, 541 (concluding that lawmakers
“should be wary of these special certificates and implement them for certain civil claims only
after finding that there are adequate empirical bases and inadequacies in other civil
procedure laws”). Such statutes have been passed in a few states. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:53A-27 (West 2010). Although they have generated a number of legal questions, see
Melinda L. Stroub, Note, The Unforeseen Creation of a Procedural Minefield—New Jersey’s
Affidavit of Merit Statute Spurs Litigation and Expense in Its Interpretation and Application,
34 RUTGERS L.J. 279 (2002), whether they have had much effect in discouraging meritless
litigation is an open question.
255. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27.
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discovered yet. But perhaps an expert report could try to educate
the judge about the general phenomenon of discrimination and its
relative frequency in the American workplace. Indeed, a dispute is
currently raging among scholars about the extent to which an
expert should be allowed to take generalized findings and apply
them to the particular situation before the court.256 Some of those
participating in the dispute are in fact testifying experts,257 but
others take strong positions from a less involved perspective.258
For present purposes, there is no need to enter the debate as to
how tailored to the particular litigation setting such expert reports
should be. At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the reports can scarcely be
expected to do more than what most of the commentators agree is
appropriate—describe generally the state of social science research
256. David L. Faigman, Nilanjana Dasgupta & Cecilia L. Ridgeway, A Matter of Fit: The
Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1390 (2008);
Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework Evidence in
Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37 (2009); John Monahan,
Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The
Ascendance of “Social Frameworks”, 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1718-19 (2008); Neil J. Vidmar &
Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 134-35 & nn.3-17 (1989); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social
Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 563-67 (1987); R.
Matthew Wise, From Price Waterhouse to Dukes and Beyond: Bridging the Gap Between Law
and Social Science by Improving the Admissibility Standard for Expert Testimony, 26
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 545, 561 (2005).
257. Hart and Secunda identify Philip Tetlock and Gregory Mitchell as partners in an LLC
bearing their names that offers expert consulting services and lists a number of their clients.
Hart & Secunda, supra note 256, at 39 n.1. Another commentator on employment
discrimination matters is Dr. Susan Fiske, who testified for plaintiffs in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235-36 (1989). Further, she has also coauthored work with Dr. Eugene
Borgida, Susan T. Fiske & Eugene Borgida, Providing Expert Knowledge in an Adversarial
Context: Social Cognitive Science in Employment Discrimination Cases, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 123, 128 (2008), and her testimony has also sometimes been used in employment
discrimination cases, e.g., Ray v. Miller Meester Adver., Inc., 664 N.W.2d 355, 364 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2003); see also Eugene Borgida, Grace Deason, Anita Kim & Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping
Research and Employment Discrimination: Time To See the Forest for the Trees, 1 INDUS. &
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 405, 406 (2008) (discussing theories of expert testimony evidence);
Eugene Borgida, Corrie Hunt & Anita Kim, On the Use of Gender Stereotyping Research in
Sex Discrimination Litigation, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 613, 626 (2005) (discussing courts’ use of social
framework analysis). Finally, Dr. William Bielby, whose testimony is a linchpin for the
plaintiffs in the potentially game-changing class action, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d
1168, 1178 (9th Cir. 2007), has also appeared in the law journals urging the acceptance of
social framework evidence. See William T. Bielby, Social Science Accounts of the Maternal
Wall: Applications in Litigation Contexts, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 15 (2003).
258. E.g., Hart & Secunda, supra note 256.
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on the mechanisms and likelihood of discrimination in the contemporary American workplace.259 This is not to suggest that there is a
consensus even on this broader issue, for there is assuredly no
universal agreement.260 Further, even assuming general agreement
259. The literature is vast and growing and often uses different terms for similar phenomena. Further, there is some confusion as to whether the research reveals old-fashioned
kinds of biases of which the subject is well aware but will not admit or a different
phenomenon, variously called cognitive bias and implicit bias. For example, the Implicit
Association Test (IAT) hosted at Harvard and available on the Internet, Project Implicit,
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit (last visited Feb. 18, 2011), has generated a substantial
amount of social science literature analyzing the results of literally hundreds of thousands of
visits. E.g., Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Harvesting
Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS:
THEORY, RES. & PRAC. 101, 101-02 (2002) (reporting results from some 600,000 tests that
confirm a much larger implicit preference among whites for whites than their explicit
preferences).
Even assuming the IAT accurately identifies discriminatory attitudes, proof that
individuals have certain attitudes is not necessarily proof that real-world decisions are
influenced by them. For that, it is important to link “laboratory” proof such as the IAT to
experiments such as those reported in Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily
and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market
Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 (2004) (reporting that, when identical résumés were
sent to employers, those receiving more favorable treatment were those containing nonAfrican American sounding names); see also Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism,
Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143 (2004)
(collecting research showing biased behavior in employment situations). Another example is
the dispute over whether race is influencing refereeing at NBA games. See Alan Schwarz,
Study of N.B.A. Sees Racial Bias in Calling Fouls, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2007, at A1 (discussing
a paper by two researchers who studied 13 seasons of NBA games and 600,000 fouls and
concluded both that white referees called fouls at a greater rate against black players than
against white players and that there was a corresponding, although lower, bias for black
officials and white players).
260. For example, the use of the IAT to infer race discrimination in a wide range of
workplaces has been challenged. See Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination
Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1023 (2006). The authors argue
that
implicit prejudice research should be accepted as neither legislative authority
nor litigation evidence until there is more: (1) rigorous investigation of the error
rates of the new implicit measures of prejudice (and of how investigators balance
Type I errors of false accusations against Type II errors of failing to identify
prejudice); (2) thorough analysis of how well implicit measures of prejudice
predict discriminatory behavior under realistic workplace conditions; and (3)
open debate about the societal consequences of setting thresholds of proof for
calling people prejudiced so low that the vast majority of the population qualifies
as prejudiced.
Id.; see also Gregory Mitchell, Second Thoughts, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 687, 687 (2009)
(“[C]onsiderable evidence [exists] that individuals often naturally engage in self-correction
and that situational pressures often encourage self-correction .... to overcome biased
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on the use of social science experts, there is room for legitimate
disagreement about precisely what the baseline ought to be, that is,
the level of generality that is appropriate for the exercise in
question. Nevertheless, substantial literature provides reason to
believe that discriminatory attitudes, whether implicit or explicit
but covert, are pervasive and that they result in discriminatory
decisions far more often than many would like to believe.
Thus, the most obvious use of such findings is the introduction of
expert reports in response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Should the
court credit such reports submitted by the plaintiff, the discrimination claimed at-issue in the decision may be more plausible, perhaps
plausible enough to satisfy the Twombly/Iqbal standard. Of course,
the defendant might also submit expert reports, which will result in
a battle of the experts, not at trial or even at summary judgment but
rather at the outset of a case. This is odd, but perhaps where worstcase persuasive pleading will lead.
But are pre-answer expert reports necessary to achieve that end?
They obviously increase the costs for the plaintiff and, perhaps
worse still, leave the judge in the situation of deciding whether to
credit them, that is, deciding whether they are sufficient to change

judgments, decisions, and behavior.”). But see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,”
and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 482 (2007) (criticizing Mitchell and
Tetlock because “[t]o say that the concept of implicit bias lacks validity because implicit bias
does not correlate empirically with explicit prejudice is therefore to assume the very
conclusion that implicit bias scholars seek to challenge—that any ‘real’ bias must be reflected
in expressed attitudes”).
In response, Professors Mitchell and Tetlock argue that
the legal community is under no obligation to agree when a segment of the
psychological research community labels the vast majority of the American
population unconsciously prejudiced on the basis of millisecond reaction-time
differentials on computerized tests. It ... should require evidence that scores on
these tests of “unconscious prejudice” map in replicable functional forms onto
tendencies to discriminate in realistic settings and that proposed remedies
actually work before making wholesale changes to antidiscrimination law and
policy.
Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Facts Do Matter: A Reply to Bagenstos, 37 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 737, 738 (2009); see also Amy L. Wax, The Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40
CONN. L. REV. 979, 984-85 (2008) (arguing that, even assuming that tests such as the IAT
establish unconsciously biased mental associations, these associations may not be unlawful
discrimination: “Biased thinking and attitudes, and mental processing of stimuli and concepts,
are not the same as unlawful discrimination.”).
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his baseline assumptions. This raises Daubert questions at a very
early stage in the process,261 which poses its own problems.
A more straightforward approach would be to look to both
Twombly and Iqbal as requiring the district judge to credit factual
allegations that mirror what such expert reports would say. That is,
the judge would have to take as true, for Rule 12(b)(6) motions,
allegations of such research.
Suppose plaintiffs routinely allege something along the lines of
social science research indicates that discriminatory attitudes are
common, even typical, in 21st century America and further indicates
that such attitudes often result in decisions adverse to African
Americans (or other minorities or women).262 This allegation may or
may not be supported by a series of citations. If this kind of
allegation were taken as true, it would arguably make any given
claim of discrimination more likely, perhaps enough to “nudge[ ]
their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible” as
Twombly/Iqbal require.263
For the moment I want to bracket a question that roils under the
surface of this argument—the possibility that what the social
science proves, if it proves anything at all, is unconscious discrimination, and unconscious discrimination may not be actionable under
Title VII.264 It is certainly true that requiring a court to accept as

261. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (dealing with the
admissibility of expert testimony).
262. I have suggested elsewhere that one of the failures of the plaintiffs’ bar has been in
educating the judiciary about the dynamics of discrimination in America in the new century.
I argued that plaintiffs should make greater use, even in individual disparate treatment
cases, of expert witnesses to educate the judge and jury about the psychological mechanics of
cognitive bias and its operation in the workplace, and the resultant pervasiveness of
discrimination even in a world populated by those who believe in equality. Charles A.
Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
911, 950-51, 998-1000 (2005).
263. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). There is, of course, a chasm
between generalized probabilities and individual cases. The fact that discrimination may be
common does not mean that a given employer is engaged in it. But, by definition, plausible
pleading seems to elide this distinction—the question is not whether this defendant engaged
in the prohibited conduct but whether it is plausible that it did so on the facts pled. Certainly,
the tendency of others in the defendant’s position to engage in that kind of conduct is relevant
to any plausibility determination.
264. See infra notes 280-82 and accompanying text (noting arguments for and against a
cause of action for implicit bias).

1672

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1613

true the allegation in question could well force the conscious/
unconscious question into the limelight.
Before addressing the conscious/unconscious question, however,
it must be asked whether this argument is not too cute by
half—whether it confuses adjudicative facts with legislative facts
when only the former need be accorded a presumption of truth for
Rule 12(b)(6) purposes. Adjudicative facts are the kind we usually
understand to be at issue in pleading, the allegations about what
the defendant did or did not do and, where disputed, are typically
decided by the judge or jury sitting as fact-finder after a hearing or
trial. They are to be distinguished from “legislative facts,”265 which
courts have traditionally found without the aid of a jury or even of
a hearing. Legislative facts are found by the courts in lawmaking by
drawing on, for lack of a better word, common-sense notions of how
the world works,266 what Professor Hartnett describes as baseline
assumptions.267 The parallel between legislative facts and Iqbal’s
view that evaluating pleadings is “a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense” is obvious.268 And a mechanism that allows parties
265. 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.03, at 353 (1958) (“When
a court or an agency develops law or policy, it is acting legislatively ... and the facts which
inform the tribunal’s legislative judgment are called legislative facts.”). The terminology
regarding nonadjudicative facts varies. See Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar
Things: Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1988) (“[Premise facts] are
facts that explicitly or implicitly serve as premises used to decide issues of law. The term
premise facts is not limited to those about which society is in agreement.... [A]fter a court or
legislative body decides on the premise facts, they are premise facts even if many people
believe the asserted factual premises do not justify the legal decision.”) (emphases omitted)
(footnote omitted); Noll, supra note 22, at 28 (describing “judgmental facts” as “in reality,
value-loaded judgments about how the world operates [that] inhabit a grey area between the
substantive law and propositions so obvious or widely-accepted they may be judicially
noticed”); see also Bryan Adamson, Critical Error: Courts’ Refusal To Recognize Intentional
Race Discrimination Findings as Constitutional Facts, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 10-17 (2009)
(distinguishing between historical facts and evaluative facts, including legislative facts);
Sherry, supra note 31, at 146 (“Foundational facts ... are judges’ generalized, but invisible,
intuitions about how the world works. They are distinguishable from judicial values because
they are, at least in theory, empirically testable. Foundational facts, however, are more
generalized than what might be called the decisional facts specific to each case.”).
266. See generally Michael J. Saks, Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works, 75 IOWA
L. REV. 1011 (1990) (responding to Peggy C. Davis, “There Is a Book Out ...”: An Analysis of
Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539 (1987)); Ann Woolhandler,
Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111, 114 (1988).
267. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
268. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).

2011]

PLAUSIBLY PLEADING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

1673

to educate judges would seem to blunt at least some of the criticisms
of Twombly/Iqbal.269
Legislative fact-finding is reached by a kind of judicial notice, but
not the very constrained variety applicable to notice of adjudicative
facts.270 The Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence
explicitly acknowledged a wide range of judicial power in this
regard: the court should be able to “find” legislative facts in the
same way it finds domestic law,271 which basically includes all
written or published sources, whether or not referenced by the
parties. Indeed, because judges can look to their own life experiences, they are not limited to written material. Although some have
argued for more formal constraints on this process,272 there has been
no success along these lines.
Although the courts’ determination of legislative facts is not
subject to formal substantive constraints, the parties may attempt
to influence such findings by evidence and citations. The Advisory
Committee explicitly references the right to introduce evidence
even of legislative facts, and the famous Brandeis brief 273 and its
269. See Schneider, supra note 34, at 569.
270. See FED. R. EVID. 201(a) (“This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts.”).
271. The Advisory Committee’s note states:
In determining the content or applicability of a rule of domestic law, the judge
is unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion. He may reject the
propositions of either party or of both parties. He may consult the sources of
pertinent data to which they refer, or he may refuse to do so. He may make an
independent search for persuasive data or rest content with what he has or what
the parties present.... [T]he parties do no more than to assist; they control no
part of the process.
FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s note (alterations in original) (quoting Edmund M.
Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269, 270-71 (1944)). The Committee goes on to
state:
This is the view which should govern judicial access to legislative facts. It
renders inappropriate any limitation in the form of indisputability, any formal
requirements of notice other than those already inherent in affording opportunity to hear and be heard and exchanging briefs, and any requirement of
formal findings at any level. It should, however leave open the possibility of
introducing evidence through regular channels in appropriate situations.
Id.
272. See Woolhandler, supra note 266, at 117-26 (exploring various proposals and
defending the absence of formal constraints).
273. The Brandeis brief was a successful effort in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908),
to defend against constitutional challenge the rationality of a state law limiting the maximum
hours women could work by marshalling a large amount of social science evidence. See Brief
of Defendant-Appellant, Muller, 208 U.S. 412 (No. 107). See generally Kathryn Abrams, The
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successors274 demonstrate that legislative facts are often proffered
in ways that track the offering of domestic law: citations to various
authorities rather than evidentiary proof. One commentator concludes that, “[W]hen lawyers perceive that a particular showing will
affect the outcome in a case, they tend to make such a showing,
which courts tend to receive.”275
As applied to the plausible pleading context, the question is not
whether, at some stage in the process, a court may look to its own
sources, including the judge’s own life experiences to find legislative
facts; rather, it is whether at the pleading stage a plaintiff may
require the court to accept as true the plaintiff ’s allegations in this
regard. Recall that the effect of a denial of such a motion is not that
the plaintiff prevail or that the allegation be accepted as true for the
rest of the litigation. Rather, it is merely to permit the traditional
process of discovery to go forward, during which the plaintiff will be
seeking more adjudicative facts to support her claim.
Another way to frame the issue is to revisit in the pleading
context the debate that played out in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The balance struck in the context of evidentiary rulings was to
strictly control judicial notice for adjudicative facts but to free the
judges to find legislative facts while encouraging courts to allow
attorneys to “prove” such facts in a variety of ways.276 A different
balance might be appropriate for the law of pleading. Put simply,
manageability concerns precluded any strict control of courts
engaging in legislative fact-finding, given that it is central to the
judicial enterprise and pervasive. With respect to pleading, however,
the demands of the system are presumably much lighter—a case
should get to discovery if the plaintiff alleges facts that make his
claim “plausible.” Pleading along the lines suggested in this Article
makes any discrimination claim more plausible, perhaps plausible
enough to move to the discovery stage.
There are, of course, potential objections to this view.
Presumably, it would allow any plaintiff to claim any kind of
legislative fact to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim. This,
Legal Subject in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 27, 39-43 (2001) (exploring the approach taken by Louis
Brandeis and others to expand the data considered by the courts).
274. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489-90, 494-95 (1954).
275. Woolhandler, supra note 266, at 118.
276. See FED. R. EVID. 201.
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however, is true in the plausible pleading regime. The Twombly
plaintiffs could have avoided dismissal by alleging an agreement
under a bridge by the defendants’ CEOs; the Iqbal plaintiffs could
have alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller met at the Department of
Justice and agreed to hold Arab Muslims to “get even” for September 11. What prevented such allegations were not the pleading
requirements per se but rather Rule 11’s limitations on the factual
investigation necessary for any court filing.277 Similarly, a plaintiff
might allege a legislative fact that the court might have to accept as
true,278 but which would result in Rule 11 sanctions if the fact were
not reasonably based. In the discrimination context, however, there
could be no doubt about the reasonableness, indeed the truth, of the
allegation that social science research finds discriminatory attitudes
and, indeed, discriminatory actions very common.
Assuming this to be true, the penultimate question is whether,
accepting that properly pleaded social science studies must be
accepted as true, such data should suffice to shift the judicial
baseline in assessing the case before it. After all, the question for
the court is not whether it is plausible to believe there is discrimination in American society but rather whether it is plausible to believe
this defendant discriminated against this plaintiff. The question is
akin to the famous blue bus heuristic of evidence scholarship, where
scholars have debated the admissibility and probativeness of
evidence regarding the relative number or buses of different colors
in an accident involving an otherwise unidentified bus.279 But, of
course, those debates occur at a later stage than the one with which
277. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
278. There may be limits even to the court’s duty to accept legislative facts, as Justice
Souter’s dissent in Iqbal suggested:
We made it clear [in Twombly] ... that a court must take the allegations as true,
no matter how skeptical the court may be. The sole exception to this rule lies
with allegations that are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it:
claims about little green men, or the plaintiff ’s recent trip to Pluto, or
experiences in time travel.
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1959 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
279. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, On the Significance of Batting Averages and Strikeout Totals:
A Clarification of the “Naked Statistical Evidence” Debate, the Meaning of “Evidence,” and the
Requirement of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1093 (1991); Roger C. Park
& Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn,
47 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2006); Neil B. Cohen, Comment, The Costs of Acceptability: Blue Buses,
Agent Orange, and Aversion to Statistical Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REV. 563 (1986).
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we are concerned: the present question is not whether liability can
be imposed on a defendant without some more individualized proof
than general probabilities; rather, the question is whether such
general probabilities might properly influence the decision to let a
case proceed to discovery.
The final question is one that needs to be left for development at
another time, and that is, precisely what does the social science
research suggest is causing discrimination? Although much of the
research is consistent with attitudes and actions of which the actor
is aware, even if the actor typically denies acting on such bases, it
is also consistent with what has been called unconscious discrimination, that is, the treatment of members of minority groups and
women differently as a result of cognitive bias. By definition, cognitive bias involves mental processes of which the actor is unaware
or, perhaps, only dimly aware. There is considerable debate in the
literature about whether “unconscious discrimination” is actionable,280 as well as whether it should be.281
By and large, the courts have addressed that issue only glancingly282 because findings of discrimination vel non tend to take a
280. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical
Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893 (2009);
Wax, supra note 260, at 984-85.
281. Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias
Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1058-59, 1072-89, 1113-21
(2009); Patrick S. Shin, Liability for Unconscious Discrimination?: A Thought Experiment in
the Theory of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 67, 69-70 (2010); Amy L.
Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1133 (1999).
282. Cases speak of stereotyping but not of “attitudes” and not necessarily of the
mechanism by which stereotyping occurs. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251
(1989) (“[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming
or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for ‘[i]n forbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes.’” (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13
(1978))); see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (acting on the basis of
the stereotype that “productivity and competence decline with old age” is “the very essence
of age discrimination”). Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust does speak of “the problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices,” but in the
context of approving disparate impact liability to combat such stereotypes: “It does not follow,
however, that the particular supervisors to whom this discretion is delegated always act
without discriminatory intent. Furthermore, even if one assumed that any such
discrimination can be adequately policed through disparate treatment analysis, the problem
of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices would remain.” 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (plurality
opinion).
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kind of blackbox approach to liability: the dominant McDonnell
Douglas analysis could reveal the workings of either conscious or
unconscious bias. Depending on the way allegations of social science
findings are framed, the result of this kind of pleading to satisfy
Twombly/Iqbal could well result in the first definitive decisions on
whether adverse employment actions taken as a result of unconscious bias violate the antidiscrimination statutes.
CONCLUSION
Pleading generally, and employment discrimination pleading in
particular, is in disarray in the wake of Twombly/Iqbal. The continued viability of Swierkiewicz and the application of Twombly/
Iqbal’s two requirements of nonconclusoriness and plausibility are
certain to continue to engage the courts. Plaintiffs’ attorneys can be
expected to try to avoid the more serious obstacles these cases raise
by pleading more than Swierkiewicz found necessary, and, in fact,
attorneys often plead more than the barebones allegations that
notice pleading, as traditionally understood, was thought to require.
This Article tries to guide that effort, suggesting ways in which,
even if Swierkiewicz were to be held a dead letter and a plea of
“discrimination” were found, by itself, to be too conclusory under
Twombly/Iqbal, a complaint could still survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion. The Article suggests several possibilities: pleading a prima
facie case under McDonnell Douglas; pleading “direct evidence” of
discrimination; pleading the existence of a comparator; and, most
importantly, pleading social science studies documenting the
pervasiveness of discrimination in American society.

